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EVENTS LEADING TO ~TABLISHMENT OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
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On December 7, 1941, approximately 113,000 persons of Japanese
ancestry, two-thirds of them American citizens, were living in freedom
in California, Washington and Oregon. A few months later their freedom
, was largely restricted and wi thin less than a year all of them were
gone from these States.
This report deals briefly with the movement of the people from
their homes) under conditions of Government control, to assembly and
relocation centers, and at greater length with their eventual movement
from these centers back into the normal stream of American life.
Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor the Department
of Justice apprehended and took into custody all persons suspected
of loyalties inimical to the interests of the United States. In this
group there were many persons of Japanesel ancestry. Within 2 months
after the outbreak of war considerable pressure developed to move
the entire Japanese population from the west coast. In February
things began to move rapidly in that direction.
On February 13,1942, the west coast congressional'delegation
formally recommended to the l'resident that all persons of Japanese
descent be evacuated from the Pacific Coast States. The next day
the Attorney General designated a strip of the California coast
~ miles in length and from 30 to 150 miles in width as Restricted
Area No.1 with a 9:00 p. m. to 6:00 a. m. curfew for all enemy
nationalities, and restricted all their movements to within 5 miles
or their homes, effective February 24.
Five days later on February 19, 1942, the President signed
Executive Order No. 9066 empowering the Army to designate areas from
which "any or all persons may be excluded." Ck1 March 2, General
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Note: This report prepared by staff members of the Relocation Division
lThe term Japanese is used in this report to mean all persons of
Japanese ancestry including the American-born citizens or Nisei and
the foreign-born aliens or Issei.
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John L. DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No.1 designating Military
Area No.1 consisting of the western half of Washington, Oregon and
California and the southern portion of Arizona. Later, Military Area
No.2 was established as the remainder of these four States. The
proclamation stated further, "Any Japanese, Gernmn or Italian alien
or any person of Japanese ancestry now resident in Military Area No.1
Who changes his place of habitual residence is hereby required to
obtain and execute a 'change of residence I notice at any United States
Post Office. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to affect
the existing regulations of the United States Attorneys which require
aliens of enemy nationalities to obtain travel pe~ts from the
United States Attorney General and to notify the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Commissioner of ]mmigration of any change in
permanent address."
To the press, General DeWitt said that enemy aliens would be
excluded from Military Area. No.1 in the near future. He also promised
that American citizens of Japanese ancestry would be excluded and
that Japanese would be the first to go. He advised persons in these
categories to move out their families voluntarily and thus save them-
selves even greater troubles in the future, emphasizing to them that
it was their patriotic duty to make this move voluntarily and with
a minimum of inconvenience to the Government. The Western Defense
Command was in effect telling aliens and one certain group of ci t1.zens
to take .their children and leave the coastal region but was not
suggesting where they might go or how they might get there. As a
result of these pleas, however, a good many thousands of Japanese
started moving from Military Area No.1. It'rom all of the neighboring
States began to come violent protests against receiving a population
that California, ~rashington, Oregon and the Army had discredited.
Apparently nobody wanted these refugees. The Japanese people were
alarmed by rumors of plans to separate husbands and wives in. concen-
tration camps and to separate children from their parents.
In ~'ebruary, Representative John Tolan, chairman of the House
Committee on National Defense Migration which was at that time investi-
gating evacuation, wired a recommendation to Washington for the
appointment of an Alien Property Custodian for the Pacific coast
region and stressed the -need of making specific arrangements for
giving assistance to the evacuees. Before such arrangements could
be made about 8,000 Japanese had been obliged to leave prohibited
"spot" areas on very brief notice or had hastily accepted General
DeWitt's recommendations. Many of these people had been victimized
by land sharks and racketeering second-hand dealers and had no money
or place to go. The testimony before the Tolan Committee on February 23
in San Francisco reveals an utter confusion of ideas and the lack
of any practical system for handling the problems of the dislocated
people.
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By March 2, when General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation
No.1, it w~~ becoming apparent to the Western Defense Command that
voluntary evacuatio~ would not dispose of the entire west coast
Japanese population in an orderly fashion or within a reasonable
time. Problems of property disposal, finance, employment and public
acceptance in other areas were constituting blocks to this voluntary
movement. The'minor evacuation movements of Japanese aliens in
February from prohibited "spots" designated by the Department of
Justice had resulted in many bewildered and impoverished families
moving in with relatives or friends in already crowded quarters or
camping in their back yards in other sections of the same town or
city. Some had moved -as far as the interior valleys of the iVest
Coast States to the dismay of some of the citizenry of these regions. }-,
Very few had been able or willing to migrate east of the State lines.
It gradually became clear that controlled evacuation would have to
be arranged for those people who could not plan or finance their
movements, and that provisions would have to be made for the mainte-
nance of a part of the Japanese population for an indefinite period
until more normal resettlement could be effected.
Up to this time the Army's sole concern in the matter had been'
with physical evacuation, with clearing the designated military areas
of Japanese. It was not considered feasible or proper that the
Military should assume responsibility for the thousands of families
involved or that it should anmjnjster an extensive resettlement
program. Such a task appeared more proper for a civilian agency.
Discussions wer~ held between representatives of the Department of
Justice, the War Department and the Bureau of the Budget, and a
decision was made to create a special war agency to assume responsi-
bility for the evacuated population.
On March 18, 1942, the \¥ar Relocation Authority was officially
created.
Never before in the history of the United States had military
decision dictated the exclusion of a largely citizen minority fram
a section of the country. No previous Government agency had faced
the same problems as now faced the War Relocation Authority and no
precedent or guideposts were available for devising its policy and
program. In the past 125 years, this Government had not even in
wartime seriously interfered with the freedom of enemy aliens except
in so far as they were individually suspected. The fact that in
this instance two-thirds of the people to be evacuated were American
citizens by pirth enormously complicated the problem. It was agreed
that the Executive order creating this war agency should be broad
and general. There was neither twe nor precedent for initial
preparation of a program'in detail. How and where the resettlement
was to take place were questions that time and experience alone
(3)
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could answer. At this stage it was believed that other nationalities
besides the Japanese might be evacuated.2
On March 7, 1942, ~'ilton S. Eisenhower, Land Use Coordinator
of the Department of Agriculture, went to San Francisco to look into
the Japanese situation. He returned on March 15 and 3 days later
the President .signed Executive Order No. 9102 establishing the War
Relocation Authority in the Office for Emergency Management. -At the
same time Mr. Eisenhower was officially appointed by the President
to head the agency.
The Director of the War Relocation Authority was "authorized
and directed to formulate and effectuate a program for the removal,
from the areas designated from time to time by the Secretary of VJar
or appropriate ~ilitary Commander under the authority of Executive
Order No. 9066 of February 19,1942, of all the persons or classes
of persons designated under such Executive order, and for their
relocation, maintenance and supervision."
FIRST PLANS (li' THE V~AR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
The first actions of the Director were to establish a regional
office in San Francisco, to recruit staff, to confer with west coast
representatives of other Federal agencies .and to devise a tentative
program. Offices were established in the Whitcomb Hotel in San
Francisco where the Wartime Civil Control Administration was already
located. 3
The first plans formulated by the Director provided that the
War Relocation Authority would have three principal functions:
2No general evacuation of persons of ancestry other than Japanese was
ordered. Individuals of various nationalities were excluded from par-
ticular sections of the country by individual exclusion orders. The
War Relocation Authority assumed certain responsibilities for resettle-
ment of these individuals but they were so few in number and needed
so little assistance that no further mention of them appears in this
report.
3 The Wartime Civil Control Administration had been 'established on
March 11 by the 1~estern Defense Command as a civilian agency of the
"ar Department to provide for the evacuation of all persons of
Japanese ancestry from Military Area No.1 and the California
portion of Military Area No.2.
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(1) it would provide financial aid for Japanese required to move out
of the military area but unable to do so because of lack of funds;
(2) it would establish a great many small work camps similar to
Civilian Conservation Corps camps and scattered through the States
west of the Mississippi River with the employable population living
in camp and working chiefly on farms in the surrounding neighborhood;
(3) it would establish a group of waystations, possibly as many as
50 holding fram 1,000 to 1,500 peQple to serve as dispersion points
from which evacuees could relocate to jobs in urban centers or on
farms. The War Relocation Authority began immediately to make a
canvass of existing housing which could be utilized by evacuees,
investigating particularly the CCC camps many of which had alreadybeen vacated by the Civilian Conservation Corps.
As soon as the San Francisco office was opened, calls began
to came in great numbers fram sheriffs and other public officials of
inland communi ties protesting the number of Japanese passing through
or settling in their jurisdiction. Calls also ceme from Japanese
informing the War Relocation Authority that they were stranded in
neighboring States because no one would sell them gasoline or necessary
services. There were also frequent calls from the press in areas
through which voluntary evacuees were moving. At Klamath Falls,
Oregon, several Japanese were arrested to avoid violence. At
Yerrington, Nevada, eight were met by hostile citizens and had to
return to California. At Swink, Colorado, local residents demanded
the recall of evacuees.
By late March it had become apparent that the resentment of
the interior States toward continued vol~tary evacuation was based
upon a complete misunderstanding of the status of the evacuees as
well as upon war bred fears and prejudices. Sheriffs from these
States frequently reported that "California Japanese were escaping"
from the military areas. Officials and residents of the interior
regions .ere not aware that the military authorities were urging
the evacuees to leave the West Coast States and establish themselves
in inland areas. There was also widespread opinion that California,
Vfashington and Oregon were "dumping undesirables."
It was obvious that voluntary evacuation could not continue
without widespread disorders and possible risk of physical violence
being directed against the Japanese. The War Relocation Authority's
first general act was to recommend to General De1'itt that. he prohibit
further uncontrolled evacuation. The result was Public Proclamation
No.4, issued March 27, 1942, requiring all Japanese to rema~ within
Milttary Area No.1 without change of residence after midnight of
March 29. In the 2-day period before the proclamation was issued
and before the "freeze" became effective, several thousand persons
left Military Area No.1. Proclamation. No.3, issued March 24 had
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established a curfew affecting all persons of Japanese ancestry in
Military Area No.1 effective between 8:00 p. m. and 6:00 a. m. during
which hours Japanese were obliged to be either in their place of
business or in their homes, and could ~ot pass between those places.
During the day they were not permitted to travel more than 5 miles
from home.
The Wartime Civil Control Administration; with the growing
recognition that a vast majority of the evacuated population could
be relocated only gradually and over a considerable period of time,
set about establishing assembly centers to receive the evacuees
temporarily until more permanent camps could be constructed and the
population transferred to the jurisdiction of the '~ar Relocation
Authority. Sixteen assembly centers, most of which were set up in
former race tracks or fair grounds, were occupied by the evacuees
under the Wartime Civil Control Administration.
gONFERENCE i\'ITH GOVERNORS AT SALT LAKE CITY
Because of the general misunderstanding of evacuation and the
status of the evacuees in Western States, and in order to explore
more fully the possibilities of a widespread resettlement program,
a meeting was called at Salt Lake City on April 7, 1942, to explain
the situation to the officials of the States in "Which the Authority
might be operat~g. The conference was attended by governors or
their representatives, attorneys general or their represen~tives,
State extension service directors, State agricultural war board
chairmen, and State Farm Security Administration directors from
10 of the Western States.
The meeting was conducted jointly by Colonel Karl fI,. Bendetsen,
Assistpnt Chief of Staff in Charge of Civil Affairs, v.estern Defense
Command and Fourth Army; Tam C. Clark, Chief of the Civilian Staff,
Wartime Civil Control Administration; and M. s. Eisenhower, Director
of the War Relocation Authority.
Mr. Eisenhovrer described the tentative plans which the War
Relocation Authority had devised for assisting evacuated persons to
resettle in other parts of the country. He explained in considerable
detail the situation and status of the evacuees and requested the
cooperation of the people and officials in facilitating their re-
sumption of normal living, pointing out that one untoward incident
directed toward evacuees would bring reprisals on Americans who had
been interned by the Japanese Government.
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Mr. Eisenhower gave assurance that the War Relocation Authority
would conduct its program in a manner WhicH would not cause long-ttme
social, economic and political problems for the communi ties in which
resettlement might take place.
Most of the governors and attorneys general, however, were
not sympathe~ic to the program as outlined. Some expressed complete
and,bitter animosities toward settlement or purchase of land by any
Japanese in their states. Some indicated definite suspicion or
conviction that California was using interior states as dumping
grounds for an old problem. Same refused to recognize that Japanese,
even though United States citizens, had any rights. Some indicated
that the temper of the people in their States could not be controlled
unless Japanese who had already entered the States were brought under
guard. Some opposed Japanese entering private business. Some de-
manded that the Federal Government guarantee to remove any and all.
Japanese remaining at the end of the war. Some indicated that the
States could operate the pr06~am if Federal funds were made available
to the~. The official conception by State officers of the t~~e of
program best suited to the situation was one of concentration camps
with workers being fanned out to work under anned guards. Salle
representatives advocated out and out detention camps for all Japanese.
The governors and attorneys general utilized most of the
conference time and, unfortunately, did so to a degree which gave
the farm elements present little opportunity to express their need
of workers from the evacuated population. The elements representing
the farmers at the meeting did indicate that evacuees were needed
for seasonal and other labor, and stressed the acute labor shortage,
parti~llarly in the beet fields.
Colonel Bendetsen pointed-out the distinction between internment
and evacuation, explaining that under the evacuation program the
military commander of an area could determine who would be permitted
to remain in the area and under what conditions, Who should be re-
moved from the area, or who might enter the area. OUtside of '
designated military areas, citizens of the United States, he explained,
were free to come and go. The Army's control over such persons
applied only in these designsted military areas.
He advised that the guarding by the, Army of small camps, such
as might be provided by former CCC camps, would be impractical from
a military standpoint, and that the Army would not undertake to guard
centers housing less than 5,000 persons.
The Salt Lake City conference was extremely disappointing to
those who had hoped that favorable reception for the evacuees could
be obtained by informing State officials of the exact nature of the
(7)
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evacuees' situation. Mr. Eisenhower, in closing the meeting, said
that, in view of the attitudes and conditions specified by the
governors and attorneys general of the states, immediate requests
for evacuee workers would have to be denied.
The Salt Lake City conference was fundamental in setting the
character of relocation centers as they finally evolved.
FAGTORS CHANGING RELOCATIONPW-.s.
In planning the establishment of relocation centers, every
possible attempt was made to make them approximate the Americ~n small
town. Even in the planning stage, it was realized that this degree
of. approximation could not be close, and once the centers came into
being it was obvious that they could never bear more than superficial
resemblance to normal free communi ties. Perhaps the most noticeable
of the deviations from normal living was the absence of cooking
facilities in the family. unit. Community cooking, community eating,
community bathing and toilet facilities which were common to all
relocation centers are not common to American living, and they tended
to lessen the effectiveness of family relationships. Equally con-
spicuous and out of the normal pattern was the barbed wire fence
patrolled by military police Which surrounded each relocation center.
Tliis not only limited the movement of residents but was also psycho-
logically bad.
It was quickly realized ~lat: (1) loyalty would not flourish
in an atmosphere of restriction and discriminator~r segregation;
(2) it was recognized that such wide and enforced deviation from
normal cultural patterns of living might have lasting and unfavorable
effects on the individuals exposed to them, particul~rly children
and young people; and, (3) that there was an obligation on the part
of the War Relocation Authority both to the evacuated people and to
the people of the United States to restore all loyal citizens and
law abiding aliens to normal useful American life with all possible
speed.
SEASONAL LEA VE
cc_-
The VJar Relocation Authority had no sooner announced its
decision .to send all evacuees to large relocation centers following
the Salt Lake City conference than agricultural interests in the
Inter-Mountain States began requesting the release of evacuees
directly to communities in these States for work in sugar beet fields
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and other types of agriculture. These requests which were advanced
with great force were in direct conflict with the governors' and
public officials' thinking in these States as expressed at the
conference. These requests began to be received about mid-April,
and by May I were ve~ insistent.
The Authority recognized that its position would be untenable
with a large reserve of workers idle. in relocation centers. Executive
Order No., 9102 had provided for es ta b1ishing a "work corps. n This
work corps plan provided that workers volunteer for the duration of
the war 'and wuuld be placed in private or public employment under
the direct supervision of the War Relocation Authority. It had been"" expected that evacuees would greet the work corps with favor and ~-
~~ tha~ most able-bodied Y:Qyngpe?p1e would wish to join it.. The first
off~cial attempt to ga~ recru~ts for the work corps was ~n the
Portland Assembly Center about mid-May. Workers joining there were
to be sent to beet fields in eastern Oregon 1;.0 help in meeting a
severe spring labor shortsge. Four men were sent from the San
Francisco regional office to the portland Assembly Center to start .
the enlistment. The7 found the evacuees wary of the work corps idea
and full of questions for which no answers were ready. The enlist-
ment form impressed the evacuees as bearing too much resemblance
to a blank check presented for their signature. No workers were
recruited at Portland and upon the recommendation of the recruitment
team the work corps plan for recruiting seasonal workers was
abandoned.
The demand for seasonal workers in the Inter-Mountain States
continued to grow. The very governors who had been opposed to the
presence of any evacuees in their areas except under armed guard were
now in the position of demanding that the War Department re1eese
evacuees from assembly centers to assist their farmers in the apring
work. Finally, at the insistance of several large beet companies
and farm organizations, most governors and other public officials
were forced to reverse their stand.
In order to protect the interest of both the evacuees and the
general public, the Director of the Vlar Relocation Authority and the
head of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, drew up a plan
Whereby evacuees could be released from assembly centers for seasonal
agricultural work. This agreement provided that the State governors
and the local law enforcement officials, including the sheriff,
county judge, county prosecuting attorney and a county canmissioner
would sign a pledge that evacuee labor was needed, and that, if
released to the county and State, the above officials would guarantee
the safety of the workers. This agreement also provided that the
employer would provide transportation to and from the assembly center
or relocation center, that they would pay prevailing wages, that
(9)
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there would be no displacement of local labor and finally that the
Uni ted states Employment Service in the county would guarantee that
adequate housing would be provided, without cost to the evacuee, in
the area of employment.
At this time, the great majority of evacuees were in assembly
centers under the jurisdiction of the Army, and before the Army would
release any evacuee, it was necessary f~r the V~ar R&location Authority
to accept the responsibility for administering the program. It was
also necessary, before any workers were released, tor the WRA to for-
ward docUlllentary proof to the commanding general of Ule Western
Defense Command that the State ~~d community had met all of the above
GouditiG~5. Upon r~Geipt of this proof, the general issued a public
proclamation permitting certain evacuees to work in a specific county
only. These proclamations were posted in the county in question and
prohibited the evacuees from moving from that county without his
permission. The first courlty which complied with these regulations
was Malheur County in the State of Oregon. Recrui ters from the
Amalgamated Sugar Company went into the Portland and Puyallup Ass embly
Centers with the officials of the United states 1!)nployment Service.
!bey at first had very little success in recruiting the number of
workers desired. Evacuees were very reluctant to venture into the
outside areas where they were still being criticized by many public
officials a~d by the population as a whole. They were also dubious
about working conditions, and were afraid that they might ~)e getting
into something from which they could not withdraw.
However, on or about May 20, a small party of about a dozen
evacuees left the Portland Assembly Center for Nyssa, Oregon. After
a few days of exploring the living and working conditions in the
area, they reported back favorably to the Portland Assembly Center,
and immediately additional workers were recruited. Numerous counties
in Idaho, Utah, and Montana then made application for workers. In
most counties and in most States, however, some of the public officials
whose names were required on the seasonal work agreement objected
to the use of evacuee laborers, or wanted to put special conditions
on their use. A great deal of pressure was applied on the Annyand
the War Relocation Authority to modify the conditions under which
the workers would be released to these areas. Hmvever, the Authority
refused, and eventually most of the Viestern States and a good share
of the counties where seasonal labor was needed, signed standard
agreements for the use of evacuee labor. By the end of June,
approximately 1,500 workers had been recruited. Attempts had been
made to recruit many times this number, and there was a great deal
of criticism against the evacuees and against the War Relocation
Authority because so few evacuees had volunteered for seasonal work.
Farmers and other employers who were desperately in need of getting
labor could not understand the fears of evacuees; neither could they
I
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understand that, out of 113,000 people, only a small proportion were
able and qualified to do the work in question.'
Many public officials were worried about the treatment evacuees
might receive in inland areas. Elements in some of the canmunities
to which evacuees were going were bitterly opposed to their coming.
\ Same threats were made against the evacuees. However, on the whole,
there were few incidents and none of these were serious. Word ~s
gotten around in the communi ties that these newcomers were Federal
charges and that anyone acting against them would be answerable to
Federal officials. There were instances of fist fights and other
minor difficulties, but the speed with which these incidents were
dealt with and the fact that inquiries were made by F'ederal officials
discouraged repetition. On several occasions, WRA threatened to
withdraw workers from individual communities and as a result of these
threats, employers saw to it that reception 'Was immediattlly improved.
Public officials who had signed statements offering protection to
the evacuees knew that they were on the spot, and were generally
diligent in quieting opposition. Evacuees won for themselves many
friends, which tended to ease tensions. Most employers were high
in their praise of the evacuees in comparison to other seasonal
laborers. This last fact, coupled with the careful, conscientious
job done by most of the evacuees, raised another problem, however,
leading to a groat deal of bidding among employers for their services.
The initial employers had gone to unusual expense t,o recruit evacuees
and pay their transportation. Other employers in the community
would then try to lure away these workers by offering better wages
and better housing. The public relations program resulting from this
labor pirating made it necessary eventually to work out a specific
contract which bound both the employer and employee as long as con-
tract conditions were met.
After the urgent need for spring labor lessened, there was
in most areas, a slack period 8nd the problem of keeping the evacuees
employed became a major one. Frequently, evacuees after only a day
or two of unemployment requested iu~ediate return to the assembly
center, leading to dissatisfaction on the part of the employer who
had hoped to keep the evacuees in the field during the entire season.
Up to the middle of July there was only one person in the
San Francisco office assigned to the administration of the entire
seasonal leave program. Everyone, including law enforcement officers,
had come to regard evacuees as being quite special cases. The San
Francisco office was flooded with questions- In some instances local
1.. enforcement officers were reluctant to arrest an evacuee who
broke local laws and ordinances, and called the San Francisco office
for advice on this and other minor problems. In July 1942, one
additional employee was placed on the staff and sent to the field
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to work on local problems. However, during all of the summer months
these two individuals assigned to the seasonal leave program had
more work to do than they could properly accomplish. 
In early September the sugar beet companies from the inter- 
mountain country sent representatives to San l'"'rancisco to attempt 
to work out a.larger seasonal leave program for the fall harvest. 
Six or eight large companies were represented, covering States as 
far east as Nebrask~ and North and South Dakota. Most of the evacuees 
were still in assembly centers and the Anny was represented at the
meeting. The process of transferring from assembly centers to reloca-
tion centers, howevar, was in full siling and decisions in administra-
tive planning at this meeting rested with the War Relocation Authority.
A general work contract was agreed upon and the ground work was laid
for a large recruitment program in all assembly centers and in the
relocation c~ters that were already opened. The Authority started
recruiting additional personnel to handle the expected large movement
of workers and by the middle of October had established offices in
Boise and Idaho Falls, Idaho; Helena and Havre, Mont.; and in Salt
Lake City, Utah. These offices were to be administered by the San
Francisco regional office. Each was staffed with one employment
investigator and one secretary. The Denver region employed two
relocation officers to work in Wyoming and Colorado.
Shortly following the seasonal work conference in San Francisco
:which was to coordinate all recruiting activities, the San Francisco i
office received applications for tens of thousands of seasonal workers. 
In addition to the sugar companies, many individual'fanners, agricul- 
! tural companies and industrial concerns applied for evacuee labor.
,I F~ch of them e~ected to get labor within a few days' tiu.e and chagrin
was expressed over dela~'s and disappointments in regard to employers'
re'quests. By the middle of October, however, approximately 10,000
evacuees were scattered through the Western States helping in harvest
work. They made a major contribution in saving agricultural crops
in the inter-mountain area during the fall of 1942.
While the seasonal leave program was getting started during
the spring, thousands of persons in assembly centers or still "frozen"
in their hames, were clamoring to be permitted to leave. Voluntary
evacuation under certain conditions was still permitted by the Anny
even after the order of March 29 was issued which forbade free move-
mcnt of Japanese out of designated military areas., Subs~quent to
that date, a relatively few Japanese were pel'lTlitted by the Military
to leave on the basis of "rather thorough investigation." !I~ost o,f
these were 'the families of persons who had previously found jobs
outside the restricted area. Although more than 10,000 persons
served formal notices of intention to leave Military Area No.1
during the period when they might leave on any basis at all, only
(12)
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4,889 actually established themselves in free territory during the
entire period. Colorado received 1,963, TJtah, 1,519, Idaho, 305,
eastern IVashington, 208, eastern Oregon, 115, with the remainder
r scattered throughout other 3tates.
About 4,000 persons migrated from Military Area No.1 to
Military Area No.2 from March 12 to June 30, 1942, when such moves
"ere recorded. About 90 percent 'of this migration was to Military
Area No.2 in California which was later evacuated. People Who had
moved into eastern California voluntarily, and frequently with con-
siderable hardship, in compliance with the requests of General DeWitt
that they evacuate from Military Area No.1, were most bitter when,
without further warning, they were involuntarily evacuated from their
new homes. While no commitment had been made by General DeVfitt to
the effect that eastern, California might not later be evacuated, it
had generally ~een assumed by this group that in comp1ying with the
general's request they would avoid the hardships of detention, whereas
in fact, they suffered the inconveniences and difficulties of voluntary
evacuation plus all of the hardships which would have been their lot
had they originally remained in their hOmes.
In addition to such leaves as the Army permitted for the
purposes of seasonal work or for individuals under special circ~
atances to join relatives east of the restricted area, some young
people were permitted to leave the coastal area for the purpos'e
of continuing 'college and university studies. Almost frorn the
beginning of evacuation a number of nongovernmental organizations,
notably the American Friends Service Committee, had begun work on
this problem with the formation of the National Student Relocation
Council. In the latter part of May 1942, the efforts of these
groups were united and brought into sharper focus. The council,
established with the express approval of the War Relocation" Authority
and the War Department and composed of. a number of college presidents
and other prominent educators, rounded o~t its final organization
in a meeting held at Chicago on May 29- President John W. Nason
of.Swarthmore College was elected chairman, and national headquarters
were established in Philadelphia- During June the activities of
the council were carried forward by two coordinate groups- The west
coast subcommittee operated under the leadership of Joseph Conard,
and concentrated its efforts on students interested in transfer and
on investigation of their academic fitness and financial status.
The eastern group, with President Robbins W. BarstOYI of Hartford
(Conn.) Theo1ob~ca1 Seminary as executive secretary, meanwhile
directed its efforts toward determining which colleges or ~ versi ties
ou'tside the evacuated area would accept evacuee students and how many
evacuees might thus be transferred.' Clearance of' colleges with the
War and l~avy Departments was handled by the Wa~ Relocation Authority.
(13)'
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At the same tiuLe the Au thori ty was exploring with a number of
coll-ege officials the possibility of extension or correspondence
courses in relocation centers so as to provide for the needs of
students unwilling or unable to tl"ansfer to outside institutions.,
, 
Looking to the opening of the fall term at colleges and 
universities, the War Relocation Authority and the National Student"
Relocation Council intensified their efforts throughout the summer 
of 1942 to arrange for the attendance of proparly qualified evacuee
students at institutions outside the evacuated area. By September 30,
a total of 143 colleges, universities and junior colleg~s had been
approved for student relocation by both the War and I~avy Departments.
In general these Departments excluded, on. the basis of military
security, those colleges having ~rmy or Navy contracts. However,
those approved included such liberal arts colleges as Swarthmore,
such State universities as Nebraska and Texas, such womeh's cQlleges
as Smith and Radcliff, such Catholic institutions as Gonzaga, such
teachers' colleges as Colorado state College of Education, such
technical institutions as the Milwaukee College of Engineering, and
such specialized schools as the Northern College of Optometry and
the Oberlin Conservatory of Music.
Under a tentative leave policy adopted on July 20, a total
of 250 students were granted educational leaves from assembly centers
and relocation centers prior to September 30. Same of these students
left during late July and August to attend summer sessions at various
institutions, but the majority went on leave in September and resumed
their educations with the opening of the fall academic. term.
EARLY RELOCATION POUCIZS==-;-- i - --
During the first months of '~~'s existence, a small staff was
busy meeting the urgent, pressing problems--problems of getting the
first relocation centers into operation; of feeding and housing; and
Dleeting the other minimum needs of the thousands of people arriving
in the centers; establishing policies for work in tile centers and
of assigning evacuees to work; of handling the thousands of requests
from western farmers for evacuee labor and of g~tting the labor out
to the farmers; of handling arrangements for individual hardship
cases-usually people having families already on the outside-to
leave the centers. At this period there became evident what appears
to be a complete reversal of national policy in regard to the dis-
position of the evacuated people. Initially the Army, in ordering
the evacuation, had apparently anticipated that the west coast Japanese
would be able, without Government aid, to move to unrestricted areas
of the country and continue normal self-~upport. The adverse
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experiences of voluntary evacuees and the unfavorable community a tti-
tudes shown in many, if not most, sections of the country to Which
they had gone, the bewildernment of the uprooted people and the
fears which many of them 50 plainly showed toward resettlement, had
caused most concerned people to be of the opinion that relocation
centers would need to be maintained as havens of refuge for the
duration of the war for the majority of the evacuees. It was not
forgotten, however, .that regulations had to be established under
which those evacuees who wanted to leave the centers for seasonal
work or for other purposes could be permitted to do so. The estab-
lishment ~f these regulations presented a problem of conflicting needs.
The legality and desirability of detaining evacuees, particularly
the American citizens among them, was questionable. However, the
hostility, doubts and fears of the public at large, engendered by
the evacuation towards this group of people, had to be recognized
as did the fears and doubts of the evacuees themselves. Consequently,
WRA decided that it would have to work out a program of controlled
relocation Which would permit the relocation of a majority of the
population as fast as the fears of the public could be allayed.
EARLY PROCEDURES
The primary concern of the War Relocation Authority at this
time was the meeting of minimum physical needs of people arriving
in the relocation centers. Little time was available to plan and
work out any kind of relocation program. Howeverl because of
extreme pressures, by the early summer of 1942, a general policy
had been established for seasonal agricultural leave. The first
general leave regulations for permanent relocation issued by the
:'war Relocation Authority were contained in a tentative leave policy
dated July 20, 1942. Only American-born evacuees who had never
lived or studied in Japan were permitted to apply for leave under
these regulationsl and leave was granted only to. applicants who
had definite offers of employment outside the area under jurisdiction
of the Western Defense Command. It must be remembered that at this
time the majority of evacuees were still under Army jurisdiction in
assembly centers and that many remained under the Army's control
until November 1942. It was consequently necessary to get ~rmy
permits for these individuals to leave. The Army was generally
extremely reluctant to release individuals. Many permits requested
by the War Relocation Authority were turned down by the A~.
Caution in planning these first leave regulations was also
inspired by instances of violence and threats against the Japanesee
which occurred during the voluntary evacuation period and by state-
ments which were still being received from many parts of the country
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that the evacuees were not wanted. Ignorance of the program and 
lack of previous contact with Japanese had led to individual evacuees being molested, and communities in Which they had arrived, unannounced, 
being upset. The first leave regulations were consequently cautious
ones and were aimed to release only individuals who could be expected
to adjust most readily to early resettlement conditions.
Even as these restricted regulations were being initiated, 
more liberal ones were being worked out, and a considerably more 
comprehensive set of regulations wIlich would permit leave for broader
sections of the population became effect~ve October 1. By this time
most of the evacuees had been transferred to relocation centers and
were under the sole jurisdiction of Ule War Relocation Authority.
Also, the outstanding success of the seasonal leave program, distin-
guished by an almost complete lack of major disturbances and the
acceptance of evacuees by residents or communi ties which had been
originally hostile, indicated that relocation and .private employment
in other parts of the country might be feasible. The Chief of the 
Employment Division made several trips Ulrough the Mjddle West during 
the fall to canvass relocation possibilities in that part of the 
country. While there had been some instances of protest from mid-
~estern communities, he became convinced that if the program were
judiciously handled resettlement of evacuees in this part of the
country was practical.
Under these new regulations, any evacuee, citizens or alien,
could apply for leave to visit or reside in any locality outside the 
evacuated area. Thr'ee types of leave from relocation centers were
provided for in the regulations.
1. Short-term leave was intended for the evacuee who wished
. to leave the center for a period of not more than a few weeks in
order to consult a medical sp~cialist, negotiate a property arrange-
ment, or transact other personal business. It was granted by the
project director for a definite period after careful invest_igation
of the applicant. If the project director denied an application
for short-term leave, appeal could be made to the National Director 
whose decision was final. 
2. ~ork-~roup leave (later called seasonal leave) W8S designed
for evacuees who. wished to leave the center for seasonal agricultural
work. Like short-term leave, it was granted by the project director
for a definite period (which could be extended) and was subject
to investigation at the center. Wherever possible, a record check 
was made with FBI and the intelligence services on applicants for
this type of leave. However" the project director had the power
to grant such leave without tilis check if he felt that circumstances
warranted.
(l6)
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I3. Indefinite leave was granted to evacuees only by the
National Director and only if four specific requirements were
met: (a) the applicant for such leave had to have a definite
offer of a job or some other means of support; (b) there must be
no evidence in the applicant's record either at the relocation
center or with the several Federal intelligence services indicating
that he would endanger the national security; (c) there had to be
reasonable evidence that the applicant's presence would not be
unacceptable in the community in which he planned to live; and
(d) the applicant had to agree to keep WRA informed of any change
of address.
The first of the four requirements for leave was to reassure
communities to which evacuees might be going that they would not
become public cParges and had reasonable assurance of self-support.
The second was to reassure the receiving community of the new-
comers' loyalty. The third requirement was made in order to give
reasonable assurance to the evacuee regarding the reception which
he might expect in the new community. It was also intended to give
the WRA time to prepare the community for his reception. The need
for such preparation was clearly evidenced by the unfortunate
experiences of voluntary evacuees going into communi ties which did
not understand their situation. Once an unfortunate incident
occurred, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get
that community to accept other evacuees. The fourth requirement
in regard to notice of address change was to enable the War Reloca-
tion Authority to serve the evacuee.
Within the centers, during the first few months of their
operation, facilities were not well developed for assisting the
evacuee in his plans to relocate. Staff was frequently inadequate
in numbers, and inexperienced in its new job. The handling of
leave applications and of advice to evacuees in regard to relocation
plans was originally made a part of the functions of the employment
division in the center which, at that time, had as its most immediate
function the assignment of workers to jobs within the project
itself and the recruitment of workers for essential project jobs.
Commonly, the same appointed staff member in the ,center was in
the position of having to choose between advising an evacuee engineer,
for example, whose services were badly needed on the project, to
take this project job at the same time that openings might exist
for the same individual in communities outside the center. The
employment d~vision staff was also responsible for the assignment
of housing in the center. During the summer of 1942, this was a
critical assignment, and frequently precluded much time being spent
on relocation.
(17)
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EARLY RELOCATION PROGRFBS 
The movement of evacuees out of the centers and back into 
life in outside ccrnmunities began very slowly. Prior to October 1,
19/.2, fewer than 273 evacuees (including students) had gone out of 
the relo,cation centers on indefinite leave under the policy of 
July 20. ~y the end of the year, 2,200 applications for advance 
clearance had been filed, but only 250 applications for indefini te
leave had been granted and only 866 evacuees had actually left the 
centers. It should be pointed out, however, that, in addition to
the 193 persons who left relocation centers on indefinite leave,
approximately 750 persons who left assembly and relocation centers
on seasonal leave did not return to a center.
The slow progress of the relocation program WB.S due to many
factors. The procedures governing leave clearance were cumbersome
and time consuming. Applications had to be assembled at the centers
and forwarded to Washington. In Washington they had to be sent
to the intelligence agencies to be checked against their files;
then they had to be reviewed and returned to the centers.
I
In addition to the procedural difficulties, there were
adverse psychological factors. 'Many evacuees were reluctant to
leave the sanctuary of the centers and face a public which might
be hostile. Others were b~tter because of evacuation and decided
they would not leave until they could return to their own homes
with all of their civil rights restored. An umneasurable but
important factor was the amount of misinfo~ation circulated at
the centers. Some of these rumors, most of them without any founda-
tion in truth and some of them calculated to arouse extreme fearJ
were deliberately concocted by trouble-makers. Some influence
against relocation was also exerted by indivi~uals who had acquired
prestige in the new communi t es and were anxious to retain not only
their l~adership but the continued presence of the people they were
leading.
Stories were whispered to the effect that relocating people
would be used as slave laborers, would be underpaid and uncared for.
There were occasional tales of individuals and even groups having
been murdered. Minor incidents and unpleasantnesses experienced by
a few of the early resettlers were exaggerated or misunderstood and
grew into fanciful tales of extreme hardship. In the atmosphere of
distrust and confusion existing at the centers, each of these rUmors
.as likely to assume grotesque proportions. In addition, a number of
the Caucasian appointed staff were innocently or otherwise guilty of
opposing plans for relocation, and of contributing to the mass of
misinformation. A small percentage of the Caucasian staff members were
(IS)
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was designed to speed the procedures of leave clearance, collecting
in one operation personal data on all evacuee residents over 16 years
of age.
The third step was the adoption in mid~arch of a policy
providing for limited cash grants to needy evacuees going out of
the centers.
The fourth step was the decentralization of the leave
clearance machinery 80 that in the majority of cases indefinite
leave could be granted at the relocation centers w1~lout referral
to Washington.
THE OPENING <F FIELD OFFIC--~
,
To administer the seasonal work program, seven field offices
had been opened in the Inter-Mountein states. While these offices
were established because of the seasonal leave program, as early as
November 1942 they began to devote a good share of their time to
promoting permanent relocation among seasonal workers, and were
successful in helping many seasonal workers to remain outside the
centers at the end of their work contract. In December, plans were
made to open field offices in the }Liddle West and East to effect
permanent resettlement.
Even before relocation offices were formally opened, resettle-
ment committees had been established in niany midwestern cities.
c.~roups of concerned individuals representing many interests in the
camnunity, particularly the churches, had formed resettlement committees
in Chicago, Minneapolis, Madison (Wis.), Cleveland and other cities,
as a result of visits by the Chief of the Employment Division during
the fall of 1942, and through the efforts .of the Federal Council of
~hurches. At first these committees had chiefly concerned themselves
with assisting voluntary evacuees who had come into their cities.
l-ater ,some of the committees began correspondence Yli.th center residents
with a view to assisting individuals to relocate.
The first midwestern relocation office was opened in Chicago
on January 4,1943. In rapid succession s~dlar offices were set
up in Cleveland, Minneapolis, Des Moines, Milwaukee, New York, and
numerous other key cities throughout the Middle West and East. By
the close of the fiscal year 1943. there were 42 of these offices
scattered from Spokane, Wash., to Boston, Mass. ~'or the next
2 years, offices showed only a slight increas~ but there was
substantial shifting in tne location as the general trend of reloca-
tion moved eastward. Thus offices in the inter-mountain region
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distrustful of the Japanese population in the centers, regarded them
as "the enemy," and regarded themselves as jailers. This small group
naturally opposed relocation planning both from a policy standpoint
and in their contacts with evacuee workers. A second small group
of Caucasian employees were overly sympathetic to evacuees and
honestly shared with them their fears of unpleasantnesses to be
faced outside the comparative safety of the centers. Because of
the obvious genuineness of persons in this second group and the
friendships Which they were able to build up with evacuees and the
consequent influence they exercised, their effect on relocation
planning was probably the greatest deterrent effected by appointed
staff members. A third and smaller group of Caucasian staff 
members were chiefly interested in maintaining their jobs and saw
in relocation planning the eventual loss of employment. In general,
the influence of the first and third groups ceased to be effective
among most evacuees as the basis of their opposition became
apparent. Many members of these t~o groups were weeded out as the
program progressed.
Other factors, too, tended to hold back evacuees. They were
seriously hampered by remoteness fram places where the~e were jobs.
Unable to make direct contact with potential employers, some resi-
dents had no effective way of knowing where jobs were, what types
were available, or how to apply for them. Also, having lived for
a few months in the center~ without earnings, many evacuees lacked
the cash necessary to establish themselves in new communities.
With all of the centers operating and the physical needs of
the residents met, a heightened awareness developed of the need to
promote relocation actively. The destructive effects of center life
on the evacuees' morale was considerably more obvious after a few
months of center living. Pressure for manpower throughout the
country also compelled recognition of the large untapped manpower
resources in the centers and of the excellent opportunities available
to evacuees in most communities. The successful use of 10,000
seasonal workers in the fall of 1942 proved that large scale relo-
cation was possible.
In the early months of 1943, the War Relocation Authority
took action in a number of ways to &cce1erate outward move~ent.
The first step was the establishment of field offices in a number
of key cities throughout the Middle West and East to facilitate
con'tact between private anp1oyers and evacuees, at the centers and
to develop w1despfead community acceptance for evacuees.
A second step was a large scale registration program carried
out at the centers in February and March of 1943. This registration
(20)
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closed or were consolidated While new offices appeared in such cities
as Grand Rapids, Mich., and Buffalo, N. Y.
Relocation offices were of two kinds, area offices and distr1c,t
offices. Each of the .i~t area offices 'WaS headed, by a relocation
supervisor and was generally responsible for relocation work of a
rather broad geographical area. District offices, on the other
hand, functioned under the general guidance of the relocation super-
visor and in the immediate vicinity of the cities in Which they were
located. Area offices were maintained in Chicago, Cleveland, Denver,
Salt Lake City, Kansas City, Little Rock, New York and Boston.
Both types of offices were assigned essentially the same
basic functions. They serve~ to provide the public in local areas
with information about evacuees and the War Relocation Authority
program. They solicited job offers, analyzed them and forwarded
satisfactory ones to the relocation centers. They provided the War
Relocation Authority with important information on public attitudes
toward Japanese Americans in communities where relocation was
contemplated. They fostered the establishment of new resettlement
committees and collaborated with those already in existence to help
resettling evacuees in a wide variety of ways to became satisfactorily
established.
In the early months of their existence, the relocation offices
were primarily cohcerned with creating favorable community acceptance
and with finding suitable jobs that evacuees might fill. As a means
of affecting community attitudes, relocation officers gave talks to
business, professional, social, civic, church and fraternal groups;
met with employers individually and in groups, enlisted the aid of
unions When possible, and spoke to employees in plants where employ-
ment of Japanese was contemplated. Newspapers were provided withinformation in regard to the program. This public relations program '
was sufficiently successful so that in most'communities opposition
did not c~stalize or become an organized movement. In those few
communities in which opposition did 'organize, sufficient support for
the program had been developed that, almost without exception, relo-
cation continued to be possible and satisfactory. As a result of
these efforts, job offers quickly piled up in relocation offices
in greater quantities than they could be filled. As an example,
the Chicago office by July 1, 1943, had offers which would have
required more than 10,000 individuals to fill. These offers repre-
sented a ~~de although not all inclusive range of occupations. War
plants and empl-oyers seeking danestic help were the most numerous
and they were the most insistent upon getting the help which they
had requested.
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The early excess of job offers over takers from the centers
led to a rather serious public relations problem, particularly in
amall communi t es and rural sections. Many employers had counted
definitely on securing the help which they had requested and same
of them had gone to considerable lemgths to prepare for the advent !of Japanese workers. Failing in most cases to get the requested '
help, employers' at ti tudes ranged from simple disappointment to
unreasonable anger and in some cases, particularly in rural sections,
to a condemnation of the Japanese group for its failure to leave
what was regarded by so~ as a life of ease in the relocation
centers and to accept wartime employment. While bitterness of
this sort was most common among domestic employers, it was more
serious when coming from essential war plants and agriculture.
,
Sending job descriptions to the centers in volume was not'
very satisfactory. Evacuees who accepted employment on the basis
of these usually scanty job descriptions and without a real knowledge
of the job or personal contact with employers often found themselves
unsatisfactorily placed and there was a tendency to change jobs as
aoon as better opened up. Similarly employers were sometimes
~isappointed in the individuals hired by cor'respondence or through
the relocation officer as inte~ediary. In many instances employers
had advanced funds to evacuees for their relocation. This made the
problem more serious.
~VE CLEARANCE REGISTRATION AND mcr RECRUI'mENT PROGRAM
The War Relocation Authority registration program and the
program of recruiting for -military service by the Army were carried
out simultaneously at all relocation centers in February and March
1943. These programs were hastened by Secretary of War Stimson's
armouncement of January 28, 1943, that the War Department would
create an all-Nisei combat team composed of volunteers from relo-
cation centers in the United States and from Hawaii. When the
War Relocation Authority was informed that the Army was plarming a
recruitment program in the centers, it was already developing plans
for a mass registration of all adult~ to speed up the leave clearance
procedures. The Army and the War Relocation Authority needed much
the same type of background information about Ule people in the
centers, and consequently the decision was n.ade to caRbine Army
recruitment and leave clearance registration in one large-scale
operation to be carried out jointly by the Army and the War
Relocation Authority.
It was believed that residents would welcome news of the
formation of a Nisei combat team as an initial step toward the
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restoration or citizenship rights. It was consequently expected that
registration would proceed smoothly. However, the irdtial reaction
of many Nisei in every center was one of resentment because the pro-
posed combat team was to be a segregated unit. They saw in the
Army's program another instance of discrimination rather than one
of restoration of rights.
In each center the registration program produced high emotional
tension, and in same centers a crisis situation. It raised issues
of major importance in the lives of evacuees--equality of citizenship,
the obligation of military service, and Issei status. In addition
to the objection of many Nisei to the segregated nature of the
proposed military service, many felt that they were being forced to
volunteer for military service whereas other Americans normally
were waiting to be drafted. This belief that they were being forced
to volunteer for military service was at least partially due to a
misunderstanding of the wording of one of the questions on the
registration form which required male Nisei of military age to state
whether or not they were willing to serve in the armed forces. While
it was the intention of this question simply to ask whether or not
the indi~dual was willing to serve if required to do so by Selective
Service, it was not so interpreted by most Nisei. Some of the
appointed staff were also not sure or the meaning of this qaestion.
To add to the confusion, it was at the same time that the Army's
recrui ting sergeants were bringing pressure to bear on the Nisei
to enlist for the combat team. There is no question but what many
of the negative answers and qualified answers to this question
were the result of failure to upderstand it. Many Nisei also
faced a not unnatural parental resistence to volunteering for
service in advance of the normal action of Selective Service.
Prospective volunteers were concerned about what might happen
to their Issei parents if they were killed in battle. They knew that
their parents could not inherit real estate under the laws of the
States in the evacuated area. They wondered if their enemy alien
parents would be eligible for GI allotments. They knew that their
elders, especially where they were non-English speaking or becoming
infirm because of age, would face more than average difficulty if
they were eventually forced out of the centers and into unfamiliar
parts of the United States without their grown children to help them.
In addition to the questicn as to willingness of the young men to
. serve in the Army, other questions were also so phrased as to make
them difficult to understand and consequently difficult to answer.
One question on the registration form which Issei were required to
answer was interpreted as, in effect, causing them to renounce Japan
and embrace the United States which country's laws prohibited them from
securing citizenship status. Answering this question in the affirmative,
in their understanding of it, would have laft them men without a country.
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The registration and recruitment programs are told in greater
detail in reports of other divisions of the agency. As far as
relocation is concerned, it had this positive result. The War Relo-
cation Authority now had accwmulated an extensive background of
informa~ion on virtually every adult resident in the centers. For
the first time, date required in connection with leave clearance
was readily available on practically anyone who might apply for
indefinite l~ave. The ground work had been laid for faster processing
of leave applications, decentralization of leave procedure, and
segregation of those wnose loyalities seemed to lie with Japan.
While registration clarified leave for most of the evacuees,
it also complicated leave for many others. Under circumstances of
confusion, misunderstanding, bad adlvice, and parental pressures, many
answered loyalty questions with qualifications. Others, under duress
and distress, expressed a lack of loyalty to the United States which
they did not really feel. Persons falling into these last two groups,
when time came for them to apply for leave clearance, found themselves
at least temporarily and sometimes indefinitely blocked by elaborate
procedures and repeated hearings with resultant delays. These people
in turn tended to delay the relocation of family members and friends.
CHANGES IN LEAVE PROCEDUl~
~-- ~ --
During the early months of 1943, as the relocation field
offices began functioning and the old indefinite leave program
began gaining tempo and broader scope, it became necessary for the
War Relocation Authority to make a number of changes in its basic
leave regulations. These changes were made primarily to speed up
and simplify leave procedures by transferring to field offices and
relocation centers several functions which had been previously exer-
cised in Washington. Under the basic leave regulations which became
effective on October 1,1942, two actions were of central importance:
(1) the application for leave clearance, and (2) the application for
an indefinite leave permit. 'rhe first of these applications was
submitted on a form somewhat similar. to the questionnaire used
during registration. Its purpose was to provide personal back-
ground data that could be used in determining eligibility for
indefinite leave from a standpoint of national security. nle
application for an indefinite leave permit was made at the time theapplicant was actually preparing to leave the center. It called -
for the specific destination of the individual, a description of
the arrangements which had been made for employment or support
outside the relocation center, and an agreement to keep the War
Relocation Authority notified of changes in address.
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Until March 1943 each of these applications, whether made
simultaneously or separately, was submitted to the Washington office
for final action. In processing applications for clearance, a
carefUl examination was made of information collected about the
applicant at the relocation center, and a check was made against the
files .of F'ederal intelligence agencies- If there was no evidence
from either source that the applicant might endanger the national
security or interfere with the war effort, clearance was granted-
Processing of applications for indefinite leave involved ascertaining
that the applicant had a definite destination and means of support,
usually a job, aQd checking as to Whether or not public attitudes.
in the community to which he was going were such as to insure his
safety. Prior to establishment of the field relocation offices,
the c~ck OR public attitude~ was u8ual~ made by writing to keyofficials and leading citizens in the co~i ty to which the evacuee ~
was going. This check by correspondence was almost invariably
unsatisfacto~ since, until public relations work was done in most
communities, reaction of public officials was commonly negative-
The first really important change in these procedures wasmade in tentative- form on March 3 and clarified in greater detail '
on March 20. As finally worked out, the new procedure provided
for decentralization of the handling of applications for indefinite
leave. The purely mechanical function of issuing leave permits
in cases where clearance had been granted was transferred to the
relocation center- The important function of 'checking community
attitudes was made the responsi~ty of the relocation field
offices. The net effect was to accelerate handling of indefinite
leave applications, to give field offices some control over the
timing of the movement of resettlers into their districts, and to
give them time to set in motion favorable public opinion.
The second significant change was adopted on March 24, 1943.
It set up a system of providing financial assistance for evacuees
leaving the centers on indefinite leave. Such assistance was
limited to cases of actual need and. was provided only to evacuees
who were leaving the centers for the purpose of taking a job. It
was not provided to those going out on student leave or those with
independent means. The scale of grants was established at $50 for
evacuees leaving the center without dependent.s, $75 for those leaving
with one dependent and a maximlm of $100 for those leaving with
two or more dependents. It was necessary to limit the size and
number of such grants quite ,strictly since the Authority had at
that time no money in its budget allocated specifically for this
purpdse. Later modifications adopted in April and May provided
that grants might be made to the families of men in the armed service
regardless of the purpose for which they were leaving the centers,
and that evacuees going out to live temporarily in hostels for the
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purpose of seeking enployment after arrival would also be eligible.
Later in the year a further change in schedule of leave assistance
grants was made to stimulate family relocation. The ceiling per
family unit of $100 had proved an Obstacle to the relocation of
larger families. The new ruling reduced the grant for the individual
going out alone to $25, but allowed $25 per capita to family groups
regardless of size. Coach fare and $3 per dj.SJl while en route to
destination were provided in addition to the fixed cash grant.
A third major modification of the leave procedures and regula- .
tions was made on April 2, 1943. Once registration was completed
and all dockets processed through the intelligence agencies, the
War Relocation Authority was in a position to speed up clearance
as a separate step in the leave procedures. The amendment of
April 2 authorized project directors to grant indefinite leave
permits without referral to the Washington office and in advance
of leave clearance, provided certain basic requirements were met.
The most important of these requirements were: (1) the applicant !
must have answered loyalty questions during registration with an ,I
, unqualified affirmative, and (2) the project director must be
satisfied, on the basis of evidence available at the relocation
center, that the applicant would not endanger national security or
interfere with the war effort. Issuance of permits in advance of
leave clearance, however, was specifically prohibited in th_e case
of (a) those who had applied for repatriation or expatriation to
Japan, (b) those whose application for leave clearance had previously
been denied, (c) Shinto priests, (d) aliens released on parole from ,
internment camps by the Department of Justice, and (e) those who ]
were planning to relocate in one of the eastern seabdard &tates -in .:the Eastern Defense Command. '
JAPANESE AMERICAN JOINT BOARD
c~-
The Japanese American Joint Board established by War Department
order dated January 20, 1943, was composed of one representative each
fram the War Relocation Authority, Office of Naval Intelligence, Army
Intelligence and the Provost Marshal General's Office. The board was
created specifically to assist in determining the loyalty of American
citizens of Japanese ancestry, and to determine their eligibility
for war plant employment. Early in 1943 the Joint Board agreed to
consider the cases of all evacuee citizens 17 years of age and over,
and to make recommendations to the War Relocation Authority on the
granting of indefinite leave.
Recommendations of the Joint Board, according to terms of the
~greement, were not 'binding on the War Relocation Authority. However,
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factual information concerning the evacuee's attitude and loyalty in l'
order to resolve to a reasonable degree any questionable factors re-
garding the issuance or denial of leave clearance. Leave clearance
was never denied except on the basis of individual hearings at the
center, and was denied only by the National Director of the War
Relocation Authority. Most of thoSe who were denied leave clearance
were transferred to the segregation center at Tule Lake.
! In order to establish a procedure Which would operate uniformly,
it was necessa~ to promulgate an appropriate administrative instruc-
tion to the relocation centers and field offices. The project director
at each center established a hearing board, and in September 1943, the
Director set up a review committee in Washington with the Head of theLeave Section as chairman. The function of this cammi ttee was to '
review objectively the project hearings and to make independent
recommendations for or against leave clearance to the Director. About
~ staff members recruited from various divisions of the Authority
served in either fUll time or part time capacity on the committee.
At the time the Joint Board returned the cases upon which ita
action had been unfavorable, the Leave Section prepared transmittal
letters and assembled material essential for project hearings on each
of them. Evacuees whose cases had been unfavorably reported were placed
. on a "stop" list and could not be granted leave by the project director
WDtil a hearing was held and leave clearance approved by the Director.
In many months of association with the evacuee population, the
War Relocation Authority accumulated a large amount of information about
each evacuee 17 years of age or older. The Leave Section files con-
tained information on such topics as the individual's education, employ-
ment record, relatives in Japan, knowledge of the Japanese language,
investments in Japan, organizational and religious affiliations, and
special aptitudes and hobbies. Reference letters were enlightening as
to the evacuee's history and his social and economic .environment.
Lntelligence reports disclosed contributions made to prO-Japanese
organizations, or affiliations with organizations considered inimical
to the" interests of the United States.
After the hearing at the center the case was returned with
a transcript, the project director's recanmendation and any' additional
rele!~~ informs tion. The docket was then prepared for the review ,
committee by the Leave Section.
The Leave Section's individual files on evacuees classed as
adults (past 16 years of age) were continuously used for administrative
purposes and were available to authori~ed representatives of the
Federal Bureau ofInve~tigation, the Provost Marshal General's Office,
the Civil Service Commission and other Federal agencies.
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,PROGRESS OF REVIEW COMMITTEE ACTION
On June 30,1944 after 10 months of functioning, the project
hea~ing boards had held hearings on 9,177 individual cases and the
review committee had acted upon them in the follow1n~ waYS: 7.187
were approved for the-granting of indefinite leave, 1,524 were denied
leave c'learance and the individuals were li sted for transfer to Tule
Lake, 50 cases were deferred, and 436 were returned to the project for
rehearings.
As of December 31,1943, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had
completed and returned a total of 77,037 :record ch~cks made since it
began checking records for th~ War Relocation Authority, leaving 2,101
pending. This balance was cleared up early in 1944.
The extensive and intensive leave clearance programs may in
retrospect seem to have been excessive in that aliens of other enemy
nationalities and citizens of other enenly-nation extraction were not
generally so carefully screened. There were, however, many pressures
making thorough check of this particular group of persons necess~ry and
desirable. Some of these reasons were entirely aside from any special
suspicion of this group as compared with others which were cat~gori-
cally similar. The Army required the setting up of the Joint Boaro.
The Civil Service Commission placed in force special discriminatory
regulations limiting the employme~t of Nisei by the Government. A
small but violent section of the press had created particUlar suspi-
cion of this group in the public mind. It was therefore necessary for
the War Relocation Authority to "clear" as individuals persons con-
demned as a group by a portion of the public and by some Governraent
agencies. Special clearances were also necessary in order to safe-
guard the relocating evacuees by giving positive assurance to the gen-
eral public that each one of them had been individually and thoroughly
checked. These assurances proved of particular value in effecting war
plant ~lacement. The thoroughness of checking was extremely valuable
in creating favorable public relations in communities Where resettle-
ment was to take place in that it gave ammunition to answer and effec-
tively block the numerically small but voc8lly loud voices of rabble
rousers attempting to make capital of the resettlement program.
The stigma placed on these people by evacuation made absolutely
necessary, from the standpoint of present and future public acceptance,
that they be cleared individually and collectively. Not until-reloca-
tion had actually been accomplished on a broad scale, and an excellent
record thoro'~ghly established by Japanese as good Americans in civilian
as'well as in military life, was it possible to say that the suspi-
cions attached to the group originally were largely erased from the
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public's mind. The elaborate and sometimes onerous checking system
was a necessary p~~liminary to the reeducation of the American people
in regard to this particular minority.
REEVALUATION OF 'mE RELOCATION PROGRAM
By early summer 1943 the flow of evacuees from the centers was
gaining momentum. .It was steadily draining the centers of the young
and unattached but was leaving almost intact the substantial group of
older people with family pesponsibilities. It was recogn~zed that
reevaluation and redefinition of the War'Relocation Authority's reloca-
tion objectives were in order, and in the first week of July the key
relocation people from the field and centers Dlet in the Washington
office to discuss the problems they faced in carrying out the reloca-
tion program. The conference clarified and unified thinking on the
entire subject of relocation, and it produced practical definite re-
commendations, implementation of Which had by the end of the year
carried the relocation program to a point where -it ,vas reaching a more
complete cross-section of the population of the centers.
Previously the slow moving machinery for establish~ng leave
clearance had retarded the advance of relocation but as of July 1,
1943, the large majo~ity of ~vacuees had been processed and were
eligible for indefinit~ leave. Allowing for the segregation of those
ineligible for leave clearance and their dependents, it was apparent
that the War Relocation Authority would be left ~~ th approxima,tely
85,000 people still in the centers. Thus far the relocation program
had resulted in the resettlement of fewer than 10,000 people. A great
majority of the relocated personA were in their early 20's and Viere
ei ther single or young couples without farrlily responsibilities. }!'ew
families were actually leaving the centers. It was necessary to deter-
\
mine What was holding families back and then to remove such deterrents
whether the obstructions were actual and material or whether they
existed only in the minds of the evacuees. The overcoming of obstacles
to relocation would require" it was realized, a revitalized education
program directed at the 'evacuee in the centers. It 'Alas agreed that
greater evacuee participation in relocation planning was essential to
the future success of the prograEl.
During the summer, surveys were made at several centers to find
out what was preventing the fanlilies from relocating. 'l'he most COrll-
plete of these surveys was made at Granada where the questionnaire
submitted produced 2,587 replies. Evacuees were asked When they
wanted to relocate and mlat their reasons were for hesitancy about
resettlement. Only 5.9 percent were interested in leaving ,the centers
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.witllin a few months, 27.1 percent said they were willing to leave only
after the end of the war, 33.2 percent were undecided as to whether or
not they should attempt relocation. The principal reason for hesi ta-
tion was "uncertainty of public sentiment"; other prevailing reasons
were lack 01' funds against an emergency, lack of information about con-
ditions outside the center, fear of being unable to support dependents,
and fear of being unable to find proper living quarters.
One principal deterrent Which was difficult to classify ,~s that
lIlany people had"become institutionalized, their wants were taken care
of, they kne\v ~~ere the next meal would come from and that they ,rould
be looked after in an emergency. Many of the older men Who had 1~orked
hard all their lives could now sit and play cards all day. The women
whose social life had been limited by tradition and who had labored
hard ~iost of their lives had found pleasure in the meetings and leisure
to which center life had introduced them. Even though living conditions
et the centers were not too satisfactory, they were comfortable end
were better than the majority of evacuees had had before evacuation.
,qith the termination of the harvest work in 1942, most of the
seasonal workers returned to relocation centers. However, there was a
substantial nunlber Who did not wish to return and were permitted to
apply for indefinite leave and stay in the area in which they had been
working. An arrangement was ~~de between one n~jor sugar company and
transcontinental railway in northern Montana for the railroad to take
over as many seasonal employees as 1rould stay for winter emplo~nent.
Several hundred workers accepted this plan. In all areas some farmers
retained evacuees for year round work. Warehouses employed some of the,
evacuees, ,~o had been working in the fields, for winter warehouse
" work, while other employers invited evacuees to stay on as domestic
~ workers during the winter months. It is estimated that approximately
500 workers out of the 10,000 r~nained out on permanent relocation.
These workers were processed under the indefinite leave procedures thatwere by then established. .
. The War Relocation Authority had no sooner terffiinated its 1942
fall seasonal leave program than it started to get inquiries from
agriculturists concerning its 1943 seasonal program. During the 1942
season, a great deal of confusion had existed in many areas because of
overl~pping of the War Relocation Authority seasonal leave program and
the Departnient of Agriculture's farm labor program. Consequently the
War Relocation Authority suggested to the Department of Agriculture in
January 1943 that the seasonal leave program for evacuees be handled by
the Departilllent of Agriculture. 1he DepartIllent of Agriculture officials
were s~apathetic but their progrEm! for 1943 was still in the planning
stage, and they could offer nothing concrete in the way of a program
for evacuee workers. The Authority delayed its seasonal work program
700077 0-46--8
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as long as possible. However, by March 1943 the pressure had become so
great that it vms necessary to announce a seasonal leave program sepa-
rate from the DepartIllent of Agriculture's program. Seasonal leave was
handled in 1943 much the same as it had been in 1942. The Authority
had a field organization, however, in 1943 and spent a great deal more
time trying to work out seasonal leave arrangements Which might develop
into permanent relocation.
During this season there was increased corapetition between
communities for evacuee services, and it was necessary to retain the
county travel restrictions Silili?ly to keep peace between comrr.uni ties
which were trying to steal each others workers. Co~llunities near re-
location centers insisted on letting vvorkers live in relocation centers
and coIiUTlute daily to and frorr. the work fields. In fairness to more
distant c01~luni ties and in order to run an orderly center, it was neces-
sary to abolish this practice of conwuting. This caused a great deal of
resentment on the part of evacuees as well as on the part of nearby
coflilliunities and the Authority was besieged with protests.
As the 1943 seasonal leave prograw. progressed, i t bec~ne appar-
ent that While the eeasonal leave program was a major factor in pro-
moting relocation, it also had its retarding effect. Mcmyable-bodied
evacuees found it very convenient to leave all their dependents in a
relocation center where they would be cared for at Government expense
while they Vlere on seasonal leave at high wages. They could then re-
turn to relocation centers securing free maintenance for themselves
during slack seasons of employment. This worked out to the apparent
advantage of the evacuees, and appeared to be a better "paying proposi- 
tion than permanent relocation. In order to me~t this situation, "it 
bec8;ae necessary to insist that evacuees going out on seasonal leave
rwilain for th'e entire period of their leave rather than commuting back
and forth as Tllany of them had done.
By December 1943 -approximately 3,900 persons had relocated in
the Salt Lake area and 3,000 persons in the Denver "area as against
11,000 persons in all of the rest of the country. It was thought that
the seasonal leave program plus the proximity of centers were chiefly
responsible for this over emphasis of settlement in the Denver and
Salt Lake districts as compared to other parts of the country which
seemed to offer better prospects for permanent relocation.
1bere were other factors contributing to a lag in general
relocation. One factor suggested by the evacuees v\~S that the
Authority refused to rea~lit relocated evacuees for permanent residence
in relocation csnters unless it appeared to be to the evacuee's best
interest. It was necessary for the Authority to place such restr
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tions because early experience showed that many of the relocatees be-
came discouraged or homesick immediately after arrival, and in many
cases went back to the center before giving relocation a fair trial.
A prime retarding factor and an outgrowth of the segregation
plan was the establishme~t of the leave clearance "stop" list. The
removal of a name from the "stop" list could be accomplished only on
the basis of painstaking hearings. At the close of 1943, there were
still some hundreds of cases on whiCh a final decision as to eligibil-
ity for leave clearance had not been reached. Some of the eNacuees
affected were not only eager to relocate but also were heads of family
i groups, 1\Ti th the' result that upon their own relocation was contingent
I the relocation of the entire family. These persons also frequently
I encouraged friends and relati,ves to delay their relocation until they
themselves were r~leased.
Consistently discouraging throughout the program of relocation
were the hindrances thrown in the way of evacuees by other Government
agencies such as certain divisions of the Army, the Navy and the Civil
Service Commission.
There were a number of developments favorable to relocation in
the fall of 1943 and early in 1944. By August 1943 public relations
work had been so effective in many communi ties that it was no longer
necessary to give advance approval to a relocation plan. Project
directors were told to encourage relocation on the basis of a co1TllClunity
invitation in these con~unities. This saved a great deal of time and
gave assurance to the evacuee of community welcome. Hostels operated
by church groups in Chicago, Cleveland. Cincinnati and Des Moines, at
that til!1e, offered living accormnodations to evacuees at a reasonable
price. These hostels, the first of Which was established in Chicago
in January 1943, ~!ere designed to be waystations in which the newcomer
to a community could lllake prior arrangements for temporary housing and
usually meals during a brief period on arriYal in the new COllUnunity.
This afforded hiln initial security and an opportunity for orientation.
Under the co1Tllnunity invitation planr the hostel provided a base.for
seeking employment :~s well as housing.
In Noveraber 1943 relocation supervisors and officers were ad-
vised to reduce the number of job offers being sent to the centers as
the nwlber of these offers had become more beWildering than enlighten-
ing. It was recognized that a different kind of in1'ormation was needed
by center residents, most of Whora knew little about any part of the
United States east of the Rocky Mountains.
During the summer of 1943, reports officers were employed in,
s'everal of the area offices chiefly to meet this need for information
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existing among evacuees. Selected on the basis of newspaper and writ- I
ing ex:pe;rience, these information specialists were primarily concerned'
wi th providing the centers with factual information in regard to their 1
areas. Information provided included pamphlets describing the geog-
raphyand economy of different States and districts, newsletters,
rbooklets on farming characteristics of various agricul'tural sections,
and first hand accounts of what earlier Japanese residents had accom-
plished. Later, pamphlets dealt with welfare services available to
evacuees, tips on starting a small business, opportunities for Issei, i
etc. Reports officers also kept the VJar Relocation Authority personnel
posted on newspaper story possibilities. i~ey contacted newspapers and
radio stations to secure the cooperation of these media in promoting
community acceptance. By then, however, reception was generally favor-
able eno~gh in the Middle West and East so that the chief emphasis was
on convincing the evacuee that it was desirable for h~ to relocate.
In March 1944, a new leave procedure authorized a trial period
of indefinite leave. A rider on the indefinite leave permit of the
person ~es1r1ng a trial period permitted him to return to the center
at the end of 4 months or at any time between the beginning of the
fifth and end of the sixth month. The evacuee on this type of leave
was to' remain in a specific area and was expected to remain with the
employer from Whom he first accepted employment. This restriction was
necessary because of the acute publi"c relations problem which had been
caused by so many evacuees jumping jobs contrarY to the existing War 
Ivlanpower job freeze regulations. Changes could be approved where the
evacuee was not making a satisfactory adjustment. Any infringoolent of
the War Idanpower job freeze regulations placed the evacuee on indefinite
leave and in the SEmle status as any other worker. Under t~ial indefi-
nite leave, the evacuee paid his own transportation costs except that,.
any time he decided to give up his trial status and accept regular
indefinite leave, he could be reimbursed for travel and receive an
assistance grant or other privileges usually granted only to persons
originally leaving on regular indefinite leave. Trial leave was intro-
duced bec~use center residents had requested some such arrangement
which would enable them to tryout relocation before severing all ties,
with the center. It was not too successful since in practice most of
the center residents who had been unwilling to relocate on indefinite
leave proved also unwilling to make a bona fide attempt under the trial
leave program.
Early 1944 also brought changes in the seasonal 1 cave program.
In February it was decided to grant seasonal leave for periods up to 7'
months with the privilege of a 2-months' extension, and to prohibit
the seasonal worker's return to the center for the duration of his con-
tract. Only two seasonal leave periods yearly ,vere allowed. Tr.ese pro-
visions ~.ade seasonal leave less attractive to the worker as they
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eliminated frequent visits to the center. It was hoped that these
changes would encourage some of the seasonal workers to take their fam-
ilies with them on indefinite leave.
In January 1944, the Authority again tried to tie in the season-
al leave program with the Department of Agriculture farm labor program.
This time the Sffort was successful and the Office of Labor of the
Department of Agriculture agreed to treat all evacuees as interstate
labor and handle them on standard interstate contracts. The Office of
~bor agreed to handle all details in connection -v.'ith actual employment
while the ~\ar Relocation Authority agreed to handle public relation
factors. In February the seasonal leave program was modified to pro-
vide for the issuance of seasonal leave only to persons recruited for
agricultural work through the Office of Labor, and employment was au-
thorized only in counties approved by relocation officers.
These new regulations providing better controls over the season-
al leave program removed direct pressure on the Authority from farm
employe~s, and facilitated the systematic granting of leaves to meet
the more critical manpower shorta~s. It was possible this year as
in previous years to supply only a small fraction of the 'demand for
seasonal workers.
l'EDEli.AL AGEN CY RULINGS LIMITING E:\iPLOYMENT
Upon the dissolution of the Joint Board, responsibility for war
plant clearance passed on to the Provost ~Iarshal General's Office.
Before discussing the method of PMGO procedure, it may be well to
exemine the attitude of the evacuees tovlard war work. ~~any thOU~lt
such work Yiould prove their loyalty and clear them of the stigma at-
tached to them by evacuation. Other evacuees, hearing of the high wage
rates being paid for war work, were interested because O'f- this factor.
Still others used the restrictions limiting errtployment of Japanese in
war plants as a reason for not leaving the centers for this or any
other purpose.
The PMGO procedure called for a system of preclearance before an
evacuee could start work in a war plant. It also ori~nally called for
the removal from war plants of those who had been hired before it as-
sumed jurisdiction of such hiring. This last requirement led to vigor-
ous protests both from the evacuees working in war plants and from
their employers. Because of these protests, the PMGO removed this
~equirement and allowed current employe.es to remain pending clearance. I
However, many who had rendered months of fai thiUI service were removed
after the P1iGO investigation and t~is was taken by the evacuee group
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as an indication that they did not have a chance for. successfUl relo-
cation.
PllfGO investigations took so long to complete that it was not
successfUl in ~nab1ing a great many evacuees to secure war plant
employment. In Au~st 1944, the Cleveland area office made a tabula-
tion of applicati"ons for war plant clearance then outstanding in the
Detroit district. There were 172. Of that number, 146 had been
pending 2 months and some as lon~ as 9 months.
Not only were evacuees discouraged and disheartened by these
delays, but employers who filed the long and cumbersome forms could
not hold jobs open for as long as vias required. 'I'he vlho1e procedure
discouraged many if not most employers from even attempting to hire
Japanese Americans.
Another c~~p1icated aspect of the PIAGO procedure was in the lack
of uniformity in which different military districts interpreted the
plants which were to be restricted. In one district a food producing
plant would be permitted to hire evacuees in advance of clearance and
in others a si~ilar company Yiould not. i'he same disparities existed
in connection with various war manufacturing or supplying operations;
for example, a railroad in one command would be permitted to hire track
workers without any clearance, but the same railroad in another com-
mand would not. The 'liRA protested these inequities frequer;t1y but the
problem Vias never satisfactorily resolved.
I
.I! Another example of Gover runent " interference resulted in the
prejudicial treatment of east coast n:erchant seamen by the I~avy and
State Departments. Thex decided to restrict persons of Japanese an-
cestry from sailing in the Atlanti~ without a passport in advance of
sailing. All other seamen could ship out merely by signing a statement
.si~ifying an intention to get a passport. This ruling barred the
l-jisei seax:-,en from the Atlantic. An ironic situation arose when
Japanese seamen were removed from ships as they returned from war zones,
many Ol~ them victims of torpedoing and all of them having risked their
lives to help deliver goods to our allies. After a great deal of nego-
tiation, the restriction was finally modified before the end of the war
in n:urope, and most of the rJisei seamen were permitted to resume their
sailing.
Still another example of goverrunental obstruction came on JUne
23,1943, when the Civil Service Commission issued instructions requir-
i ing a special investigation by the Co~ssion prior to appointment of
American citizens of Japanese ancestry to positions in Federal agencies.
rrhis was the only group for which such investigation wa~ required prior
to hiring. l...any l~isei were rejected for, rederal employment and n~ny
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more ,-{ere discouraged. and did not apply; some 'lfiere given third degree
investigations and kept in suspense- for months thereafter. Some of
those all'eady on the payroll remained on their jobs pending completion
of an investigation and others were immediately removed.
~VACtTE~ PARTICIPATION
Ii By the latter ha"1.f of 1943 field offices had established that
satisfactory relocation plans could be made for almost any individual
or fandly group, regardless of any special problems the individual or
the family migh~ present. The relocation centers, however, had con-
tinued to work primarily with those individuals obviously best able to
relocate, and even among this group they had worked chiefly with those
strongly desiring to leave the centers. It was nece5;sary, consequently,
to chanws the emPhasis in the centers and to intere~t families less
sure of themselves or more lacking in knowledge of outside communities.
,
: Throughout the last half of 1943, increasing emphasis was placed
on evacuee participation in relocation planning. As early as July
several of the centers had relocation committees co~,posed of residents.
The~e were nov, strengthened, in some cases, by being brou f)1t Wi thin the
authority of the evacuee con1Imlnity council, or by being given a defi-
nite relationship to appointed staff committees on relocation. By the
end of the year, two centers bad functioning combined evacuee-staff
relocation committees, While at all other centers the evacuees had
formed their 0"Wn relocation planr,ing corr.rnissions v,rhich maintained
relations V1~ th responsible members of the appointed staff. Issei were
viell represented in these groups. The committees took'their responsi-
bilities seriously, assembling the questions which needed to be
ansvrered before the greater relocation movement could get under way,
and formulating recommendations.
.QB..Q!!L~CATJ_ON
About /4-3 percent of the evacu.ated people were farI:lers, and it
was eXpected that they vlo\lld ",ant to continue in afYicultural !'fork.
Having sustained heavy financial losses in the course of the evacuation,
'many families did not ha,re moriej~ enou~ to start far~,ing in a new
region. Pooling of resources of several families mi~ht partially over-
come this difficulty. Hov\~ver, many ,rho did have sufficient ~oney or
who cquld arrange for financing were unwilling to risk their small
cspital in new fields. Good land available for lease or sharecropping
was not easy to find, and farm machinery '~as diffi~Jlt to secure under
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wartime conditions. A great many people believed th8t some of the
difficulties of reestablishing farmers could. be overcome by securin~ 
opportunities for %f~ps of families to leave the centers and brave
the hazards of unfanliliar soil and c1im.ate together. In re~ation t
group farming ventures, it was considered imperative that responsible;
representatives of. the f;1'OUp be allowed to ,go out and investigate the !!
opportunity before they-committed themselves. v:
In November 1943, the fo110~~ng su~~stions v,ere sent to all
projects to assist group relocation: stimulation of credit unions to
provide resettlement loans; aid to evacuees in securing loans from
rederal and private financing a~encies; exploration of group relocation
opportunities by relqcation officers, with particular regard to agri-
cultural possibilities; and arranroements for evacuees representingrona fide r:;roups to make exploratory visits. '
,Like trial indefinite leave, this program did not result in any
considerable relocation. Only a fev, scattered families attempted rural
relocation outside the Inter-11ountain States where farming methods were
similar to those on the west coast. Considerable mtmbers 0;1: the season-
al workers ymo had gone into the Inter-11ountain States did succeed in
establishing themselves as independent farmers. Seabrook Farms in New
Jersey attracted a large mtmber of evacuees for labor work, and the
Becker Farms in l'ilichi~an also :stimu1ated the -relocation of agricultural
'"
workers considerably.
~"ELFARE COUNSELING
Surveys made during the sumnler showed that greater emphasis had
to be placed on individual and family counseling if families were to be
relocated. It \~s realized that to accomplish the relocation of fam-
ilies who were hesitant about relocating it Yfould be necessary to help
more of them to plan on an individual basis. It was decided to estab-
lish a separate welfare counseling unit at each center with a vieT.
both to breaking down the rationalizations of reluctant families and
to gathering information which would enable ViRA to plan realistically
its future program.
SO CIA~ SE amITY AGREE:bi.m
An agreement with the Social Security Board by Which relocated
evacuees were e1i~ible for service and assistance under the pro~am for
aliens and other persons affected by restrictive governmental action
became operative in this period in all States except Colorado. This
I
I
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program gave assurance to evacuees that emergencies would be adequate~y
met in comImlnities to which they might be planning to go. ~fust States
have residence laws relating to welfare assistance, requiring from 1
to 3 years'residence before ~lblic welfare assistance can be given, and
assistance gi¥en throu~p the Social Security Board lent assurance that
assistance would be available dl1ring the period in which evacuees would
be nonresidents~ V\hile the number of evacuee applicants for such ser-
vice was not lar~, the designated State apencies cooperating ~~th the
. Social Security Board did provide assistance in a number of cases of
emergencies, illness, and other contingencies, and assumed responsi-
bility in a smaller number of 'instances of continuing need.
NATIONAL HOUSI~IG AGENCY AGREElviENT
Vuring the summer of 1943 an agreement was concluded with the
~Jational Housing Agency designed to assist relocation officers in one
of their most critical problems. By the terms of this agreement, the
relocation supervisor of a specific area was to advise the NHA regional
representative of current and anticipated in-migration trends. In
return, the J\1JiA would "assist li'.RA in determning the acceptability of
evaCtlees for housinp; in the locality," and also "be prepared to suggest
the names of localities where the opportunities for housing evacuees
were most promising." This did not work out very well since, where
housing was easily secured, other relocation factors such as employment
v,ere not favorable. The agreement ~~s not specific enough in practice
to be of direct value, but did encourage many local units to cooperate.
llovrever, not until 1944 did manY'Vlar housing projects accept evacuees,
and even then many experienced difficulty in meetin~ war housing re-
qllirements ~nich commonly included R rather low income ceiling and the
requirement that the occupants be engaged in war work.
DISSEI,l~NATION OF .~~CA!ION INFORJ..'IATION
In l1ecognition of the fact that the movements of evacuees out of
the centers YfaS in a sense dependent upon a steady flow into the centers
of accurate information concerning job opportunities and living con-
ditions on the outside, two techniques for accomplishing that end
wel'e stressed toward the end of 1943. Specific information from the
area offices, including listings of job offers and personalized ac-
counts of actual relocation experiences v.~re sent directly to the
centers. Personal experiences of resettlers were sometimes submitted
in letter form and sometimes in informal reports or in the publications
issued by area offices for center (~istribution. The second plan pro-
vided for sending to the centers individuals or teams of indi victuals
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,thoroughly conversant with conditions in speciric localities in order
to give interested evacuees personal contact with people able to answer
their que~tions. At first these visits were made largely by individual
relocation officers, but in November arrangements were made for an
experimental relocation team, consisting of two relocation supervisors,
a member of the V~ashington relocation staff, and a member of the
Vvashington Reports Division, to visit Rohwer Relocation Center. Cbn-
siderable preparation was made by not only the members of this team,
but by the entire relocation field sta.ff to make sure that the team
would be provided with every available informational tool. Relocation
ki ts were prepared ~n some communi t es, bringing together every form
of informational printed matter that could be prepared or secured
describing the district or area. Dozens of movies descriptive of
occupations and districts were viewed and some of them selected for
the team's use. District offices prepared for the team full descrip-
tions of their more attractive relocation opportunities. The team
members addressed large general meetings and sma.ller meetings of
specific project groups, and in addition conducted numerous interviews
Wi th indiVidual evacuees seeking further information. The effect of
this team's visit resulted in plans to continue the practice of sending
relocation officers, especially specialists in.specific fields such as
agriculture. It Vias also decided to continue to have relocation teams
make a tour of all the centers during the early part of 1944.
,
In addition to the efforts being made by the Yiar Relocation i
Authority itself 'to inform evacuees of resettlement opportunities and
conditions, another group of center visitors at this time was serving
much the same purpose and ~~th even more obvious imnediate results.
Employers planning to hire large numbers of evacuees sent recruiters
sometimes to one center and sometimes to all of them. The recruiter,
when he was an able man, frequently achieved excellent results since
he had the advantage over representatives of the Authority of being
able to concentrate on one job and one community Which lle knew ex-
tremely well. By this nleans .the confusion could be avoided Which
sometimes developed in the evacuees' minds when presented with not one
but hundreds of communities and jobs. Recruiters were employed suc-
cessfully b~ a wide variety of employers and from many sections of the
country. They ranged from wealthy indi~dua1s visiting a center to
attempt to hire one or several domestic servants to large industrial
employers, such as the International Harvester Cbmpany, seeking to
employ hundreds of factory workers. Hotels were among the more
successful and persistent recruiting organizations, the Stevens Hotel
in Chicago, for instance, having hired several hundred evacuees by
this process. The largest scale recruitment ~J a private concern was
done by Seabrook Farms in New Jersey, .which offered not only large
scale group employment., but also group living Which proved particularly
attractive to Issei. Railroads recruited for track laborers, frequently
offering family housing as well as employment. Government agencies
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Ialso participated in the recruiting of workers in the centers. The
Office of Strategic Service, the Army Map Service, and Army and Navy
intelligence schools carried on vigorous recruiting programs in all of
the ~elocation centers. They recruited hundreds of ,workers. The
Ordnance Department of'the Army, beginning in the late SUIl'.mer of 1944,
also recruited several hundred evacuees for arsenal work. These
arsenal jobs effected considerable family relocation since they offered
I fami~ housing. The Vlar Hemp Administration recruited more than a
hundred men for middle western jobs in Government operated plants
processing hemp. Vihile the numbers recruited by 'these Federal agencies
were small in comparison with the total number of people to be relo-
cated these recruitments provided a great impetus to the relocation
I progrBln. The utilization of evacuees in essential war employment by
these agencies provided good public relations material to stiDUllate
the use of evacuees by other essential employers. These recruiting
campaigns also served to reduce the psychological barriers which were
being built up in the minds of many evacuees.
Particular stress was laid in the field at this time on securing
and bringing to the attention of the centers jobs which offered housing
together with employment for one or more families. Large private
estates and public and private institutions proved particularly able
to provide this' type of job and hdUsing combination. .
P~NING FOR OOP/JWNIrX ADJUSTMENT
From the beginning of the relocation program, many chuvch groups
and other interested agencies had been active in creating local inter-
est in the ¥J"RA program, and in many comtmlnities they provided the
relocation officer with local sponsors to whom he could turn for advice
and assistance. As the program broadened and more persons relocated,
it became evident that a broader cross-section of comtmlnity cooperation
was essential, not only to assist ViR;. i~ matters of employment, housing
and public relations, but also to provide in the COmtmlnity a solid
foundation for the acceptance of evacuees on the same basis as other
residents. There WES need to implement locally national agreements
worked out by \~RA and other public and private agencies, and to coor-
dinate the efforts of other groups so that the resources they possessed
might be available for the use of evacuees. In recognition of this
neecl for more far-reaching planning in community adjustment, persons
on the staff of the area offices were desi~ated to specialize in the
or ganization of community resources.
There were t.vo main objectives in this painstaking work with
local committees and agencies: (1) to ease the transition of the
evacuee from the isolated and socially artificial centers to life in
a normal cotmmnity by meeting the resettler with an understanding of
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. his situation; (2) to encourage relocated evacuees in assisting their
family members and friends to relocate. The youth and inexperience of
these very young people who had gone ou.t from the'centers, usually
~lone, to adjust to life and work in a completely strange environment,
pointed more and more to the need of having their families join them.
During the fall of 1943, there was evidence that young people in
Olicago, New York, and certain other localities were beginning to bring
their parents out of'the centers. VI'here this happened, the infusion
of the older generation made for a more stable and better integrated
social situation among the newcomers.
AnaNISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION roR REI.O~TION
A significant development during the latter half of 1943 was the
growing conviction that the relocation program was a cooperative one to
which all divisions of the Authority had a contribution to make. Orig-
inally the handling of the relocation program, both in the national
office and at the centers, was the function of the Ernployment Division.
It was not long before the conflict between project employment and
relocation was apparent. As relocation progressed, the dual obligation
of this division to maintain center operations and at the same time to
urge all the efficient workers to leave center employment for reloca-
tion kept the division in constant conflict ~~thin itself and ,vith
other center operations. It was understood that project employment
must be subordinated to relocation. The fact remained that the
Employment I[vision ~~s being called upon to build up a community wi,th
one hand and tear it down with the other. Relocation committees, con-
sisting of representatives of the employment, reports, and community
management divisions, finally were set up in the ',iashington offi~e and
at the centers. The work of these committees in some measure relieved
the Employment Division, but there was increasing awareness that relo-
cation interests could best be served by a special division created
to devote all its energies to relocation. On the basis of discussions
held in the lJJashington office and of suggestions received from the
field, the Relocation Division was organized in November 1943. The new
division was assigned all functions previously performed by the
Employment Division, except that at the project level, project employ-
ment and housing was made a function of personnel management, and in
the national office, leave clearance Vias made the responsibility of the
A~~nistrative 11anagement Division. The new division also took over
the functions of the l~location Assistance Division except those in-
volving evacuee property, which were assigned to the Admi~istrative
)ilanagement Division.
\'iith this reorganization, a greatly increased staff in ;~ashingtDn,
the field, and at the projects was assigned to relocation. ~ the
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close of-1943, the division of responsibility between the various
divisions of the Authority had been clearly established, and the
Relocation Division was working toward closer relationships vdth other
Federal agencies and private organizations at the national level. The
strengthening of the relocation staff at the- cent~rs and expansion of
the field program gave added emphasis to adjustment of evacuees in com-
munitie~ of relocation, and to exploring increased opportunities for
family and group' relocation.
Fr,om the Yiashington offipe, arrangements Ylere made vii th the
Travelers' Aid Society and the Family ji-elfare Association of America
to provide the cooperation of their branch offices and affiliated agen-
cies in virtually all large communities where relocation activities
were in progress. Other relationships, previously established vdth
public and private agencies, were reviewed and modified, where neces- .
sary, to tie them more closely into the relocation program.
There had been repeated requests by organizations of center
residents and by some individuals for information in regard to the
availability of loans for the establishment of ~mall businesses and
the resumption of farming. During this period the Authority made vari-
ous attempts to seC11re agreements with such Federal agencie~ as the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Farm Sec1.1rity Administration,
and the Federal Land Bank to finance evacuees who wished to reestablish
business or farnnng operations. Token assurances of cooperation were
forthcoming, but few, if any,loans were ever actually negotiated by
evacuees from these sources. One of the difficulties was that of
zetting an evacuee with reasonable !)rospects for a loan to go throu.g)1
the process of actua!ly applying for one. Most evacuees were unwilling
to leave the center and work out a business plan as was required by
loaning a~ncies unless they could receive definite assurances that
they would get such a loan. In many instances, it appeared that evac-
uees were using their demands for easy loans as a rationalization for
not leaving the centers. The 11econstruction finance Corporation's
regulations '~re not clear as to aliens' eligibility for loans and no
Issei vlould apply. It was found that the Farm Security Administration
had more pending applications than funds avaj.lable for loaning purposes.
Some evacuees Yiere able to establish a basis for securin~ loans and did
secure them generally througp normal private banking org~nizations.
~lere were also a few instances in vmich loans for the establishment of
businesses were made by private welfare or~anizations, and in at least
one instance, through a fund established by a resettlement committee.
!, At the relo~ation centers, the program of relocation counseling,
I which was to have been the responsibility of the welfare section, was
revitalized and was divided betyreen that section and the relocation
division. '/,elfare counselors ,vere assigned to interview families with
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vrelfare problems al~eady known to that division. The relocation divi-
sion assumed responsibility for all ~emaining families. This counsel-
ing proflJ:'am which was completed during 1944 gave a wealth of information
concerning the problems and the thinking of evacuees in regard to
~elocation.
The greatest difficulties i,n .relocation planning arose with
families which presented dependency problems or se~ious social malad-
justments. In such cases careful planning with outside social agencies
,',as indicated. It was also necessary to make special plans for the
I relocation of unattached children as well as to assume the guidance of
youths of 17 and 18 in their new comIlnlnities by chu~ch f!):'oups, social
agencies, or responsible ~elatives.
For those families and minors definitely planning relocation,
but obviously .requiring continuing financial assistance or social
gQidance, a plan Vias worked out under ,vhich definite responsibilities
were assuraed by local social agencies p~ior to movement of the family
or individual from the cente~. Detailed family summaries vrere pre-
pared in the relocation cente~ and submitted to. the area office having
jurisdiction over the community in which the individual or family
planned to relocate. The area supervisor or area adjustment officer
- then presented these summaries to the app~opriate local welfare a~ncy,
securing either an accep~ance of the case or a refusal of the c.ase,
with reasons for such refusal. This plan not only served to reassure
the persons relocating under i~, but also provided the social agency
wi th a vfeal th of background material enabling them to be of greater
assistance to the resettler.
w\'hile the need for rnore effective evacuee participation had
been recognized previously, it had been extremely difficult to get
responsible evacuees to take active part as relocation was not too I
popular at the centers. By June 1944, however, relocation planning
commissions, composed of evacuee representatives, ha.d been organized
at most of the c6nteTs. Tha'fwere calculated to exercise an ,important
influence not only in the day-to-day planning of relocation ac.tivities,
but also in gaining acceptance for the program among the eva~~ee resi-
dents. These evacuee commissions were sometimes helpful in dissemi-
nating information about specific relocation opportunities and
interpreting ~\RA policies. At several centers they sponsored the
interviewing program and recommended several important changes in
policy to stimulate wider interest in resettlement. At other centers,
the commissions proved ineffective because of differences 9f opinion
between groups and leaders in regard to the desirability of relocation. I
To encourage the relocation of families~ several significant
modifications were made in th.e leave assistance pTogram. The limita-
tion was removed on the weight of personal property Which relocating
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families could have shipped at Government expense. Shipment, not
previously available at Govermnent expe~se, was authorized for the
equipment, tools and fixtures essential to an evacuee's trade, business
or profession (not to exceed 5,000 pounds), when replacing them in the
area of relocation was not feasible because of wartime shortages.
Pullman accommodations were made available for the sick and the infirm
relocating with their families, and coach fares were authorized for
the representatives of evacuees selected for the purpose of making a
final investigation of relocation opportunities, when such trips were
approved by the relocation officers concerned.
t, In the relocation field offices, as well as in the vVashington
office and at the centers, special efforts were made to get more fami-
lies and older people to relocate. Evacuees already relocated were
encouraged to plan with counselors from social agencies and the \\1iA
I field representatives for resettlement of thei~ families and friends.
, During the first half of 1944,10 district offices were closed
and 4 new offices were opened. 'Most of the offices closed were in the
Inter-Mountain Area, where the assumption of responsibility for season-
al workers ~ the Department of Agriculture eliminated th~ need for
these WRA offices. Two of the new offices were established in Savannah
and New Orleans to pioneer the development of relocation opportunities
in the South.
'~ith the opening of offices in the South, relocation was being
offered in all parts of the country, excepting in the evacuated area.
-vJithout bringing undue pressure on individuals as to selection of their
destination, the Authority did encourage as broad a distribution of
Japanese as possible and was proving reasonably successful in securing
I their dispersal throughout a great many sections of the count~y.
The total project -population had be,en sufficiently reduced by
relocation that the Director decided to eliminate one of the relocation
centers and to transfer remaining ~esidents to available quart~rs in
other centers. It was realized that some step had to be taken to af-
fect the complacency which was making many individuals and groups in
the centers resistant to relocation. It was hoped that closing one
center and indicating that other centers would gradually be closed
would have this desired effect. Announcement was made on February 22,
1944, that the Jerome Relocation Center, in Drew and Ghicot Oounties,
Arkansas, would be closed on June 30. Jerome was small at the time,
having only 6.600 residents. It was close to Rohwer, making. transfer
of many of the residents easier. The center was closed on schedule.
. .
Yfuile the center and all field office~ made great effort t.o relocate its
,residents, the immediate effect on relocation. either from Jerome itself
or from the other centers was not as Rreat as had been hoped for.
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The closing of relocation centers on an individual basis Vlas not con-
tiInled, since before further center closures became practical, it began
to appear that the exclusion order might be lifted in the near future
and that it would lead tq the general dissolution of all relocation
centers.
REWCA TION PROGRESS-
During the first half of 1944, despite the increased attempts to
stimulate relocation, only "about 10,000 people relocated as compared to
approximately 8,000 in the previous 6 months. The surprisingly small
increase was disappointing since this had been the first period in
which field and center relocation staffs had been adequate to handle a
much greater Inlmber of people. One favorable aspect was that a ~eater
percentage of the people relocating were Issei.
Up to December 1944, relocation progress was contiInling inrnuch
I the same pattern as it had in earlier months, except that during the
last half of 1944 about 2,000 less people relocated than during the
first half. Field offices had, in general, completed their job of
creating favorable acceptance in most communities. Jobs were available
in a tremendous range of occupations, and earnings were high in many
cOnmnlni ties. OJ. ties such as iliicago, lViinneapolis, Cleveland and New
York not only had a great surplus of all ordinary types of jobs, but
could give reasonable assurance to an evacuee with even the most out-
of-the-way skill or profession tpat employment in his own 'or a related
field could be obt~ined. Many communities in which employment was
readily obtainable could also give assurances that adequate housing
was available.
The job, however, in the relocation cepters was becoming more
and more .difficult, since for the most part the adventuresome, unat-
tached young people and the more confident and self-reliant families
were gone. Many with lar ge families were fearful as to their ability
to support their dependents on the outside as well as they were being
supported by the Government in the centers. No amount of successful
relocation by families va th similar problems seemed to convince them
that they should do likewise. Center living Vias being accepted as a
normal way of life by many people, and complacency in regard to it was
common. Apathy marked the attitude of an increasing Inlmber, and it was
apparent that contiInled center living was not only demoralizing, but
was tending to disintegrate the fiber of a people "mo had, previous to
evacu£tion, been uInlsually self-reliant, sturdy, and independent.
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I Children were being especially a£fected by the segregated nature
I or camp life J by lack of contact with other Americans. It was also
apparent that the majority of the people remaining in the centers could
neither continue living in them without great personal and social loss
to themselves and to the Nation, nor oould they be induced by voluntary
methods to relocate. It was believed that most of the people would
leave voluntarily if they could return to their former west coast homes.
The War Relocation Authority repeatedly brought these facts to the
attention of the Army and urged the earliest possible rescinding of the
general exclusion order.
~
RESCINDING OF THE GENERAL EXCLUSION ORDER
~ THE EFFECT ON REL~ATIOlT
On Deoember 17, 1944, the Western Defense Command revoked the
west coast general excl~sion order for persons of Japanese ancestry
which had been in effect since March 1942. The lifting of the order
was effective January 2, 1945. It was the most significant event since
evacuation, both in the life of the evacuated people and in the program
of the War Relocation Authority. To the great majority of evacuees, it
meant full restoration of freedom of movement; to the War Relocation
Authority it signified the beginning of the final phase of its program.
The relocation program was for the first time on a completely nation-
wide basis.
The reopening of the evacuated area and the broadening of the
relocation program came at a fortunate time for the evacuated people.
Jobs were plentiful and there was excellent; demand for workers in war
plants, in civilian goods production, in service occupations, and on
farms. Throughout its program, the War Relocation Authority had
repeatedly advised evacuees to relocate during the period while war
time prosperity was at its height. After the lifting of the exclusion
order, many were able to reestablish themselves before the war's end.
Those who returned to the west ooast after August 1945, when war plants
were beginning to olose and there was beginning to be some local unem-
ployment, had a less wide choice of jobs than would have been available
had they left earlier. For these people and for the War Relocation
Authori ty, the final relocation job would have been easier had the
exclusion order been lifted earlier.
Coincident with the lifting of the exclusion order, WRA
announced plans for its own liquidation. All relocation centers were
to be closed wi thin a period of 6 months to 1 year after the revocation
of the exclusion order. However, no center 'WaS to be closed without
700077 0-46--4
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3 months' advance notice to the residents. Other policy changes
covereq in the liquidation announcement were!
1. Leave permits were no longer to be required of evacuees
leavi~g the oenters for purposes of relocation. Seasonal leave
was abolished since the emphasis had to be on permanent reset-
tlement. Many evacuees protested this decision to discontinue
seasonal leave. The Authority also received a great many
protests from agricultural groups. However, the Authority
agreed to encourage all evacuees who wanted to leave centers
permanently to go out on so-called seasonal jobs and relocate
trom there, but refused to allow persons leaving on seasonal
jobs to return to the centers. All departures from the centers
henceforth were to be terminal departures or short-term leave
for investigation purposes or emergencies.
2. Reinduction for residence at centers was no longer permitted
for evacuees who had left the centers for purposes of relocation.
3. Approval of relocation officers in the field was required
for all visits to the centers, and such visits were limited to
those which would contribute to the relocation of family members
in the centers or to emergencies, with exceptions in the case of
members of the armed forces or the Enlisted Reserve Corps.
Center visits were initially limited because it was feared that
many of the 35,000 persons already relocated might return to
relocation centers with a view to reestablishing themselves as
center residents so that they might better, as they thought, be
able to take advantage of such assistance as the Authority might
offer for reestablishment on the west coast. It was also feared
~t any large influx of visitors at first might complicate
center administration and the application of new, stepped-up
relocation procedures. As a wartime measure, the Authority also
did not feel justified in encouraging excessive use of rail
transportation at a time When war needs required that as few
people use trains as possible. Within a short time, the
Authori ty was able to get adequate information to resettlers,
and the need for visiting limitations ceased to exist. At that
time restrictions were lifted.
4. Less essential services at the centers were to be sharply
curtailed. Schools were to be continued only through the spring
tenn..
5. Field offices were to be set up in the evacuated area to
facilitate the return of evacuees, and, simultaneously, increased!
stress was placed on the relocation advantages of other areas of Ir t.he country as well. '
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G. Only those evacuees whose relocation plans were approved by
WRA would be eligible for relocation assistance. This was done
solely to enable the Authority to control any stampede which
many people outside the Authority feared might develop toward
any .one coIlmluni ty or area. In practice. no such mass movement
developed anq this regulation did not limit individuals from
moving where and when they wished.
1. Evacuees who had already relocated elsewhere. but who had an
approved plan for resettling in the evacuated area.were to be
entitled to the relocation transportation assistance for them-
selves and property on the same basis as those who were leaving
the centers for the first time.
The Direotor announced these reasons for adopting the liquidation
policya
1. Center living was bad for the evacuees. It did not provide
an atmosphere in which children could develop in the normal
American pattern. It was generally destructive of good work
habits. of the sense of responsibility on the part of family
heads. and did not provide normal family living conditions.
For their own welfare. the evacuees needed to get back into the
life of the usual American community. This could be accomplished
only by closing the centers.
2. The country. still at war. needed the skills and the manpower
represented by the center population.
3. The Congress would undoubtedly question the necessity of
appropriating funds to continue centers. (Some Congressmen
later questioned the necessity of maintaining centers for even
the period which WRA considered essential to orderly liquidation.)
4. As long as this segment of the population rem&ined concen-
trated in the centers. they were more vulnerable to campaigns
directed against them by their enemies. The very fact that they
were set apart tended to heighten the impression that their
loyal ty was in question.
5. If centers were to be liquidated. it should be done during
the wartime period of high employment .when relocation opportuni-
ties were favorable.
Early in the year. WRA endeavored to anticipate the needs of a
Nation-wide relocation program made possible by revocation of the exclu-
sion order. Since the great majority of evacuees could now go back
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home. machinery was set up in the evacuated area similar to that already
operating in other sections of the country. Three area reloca~ion
offices were established: (1) southern California and Arizona, wi~h headquarters in Los Angeles j (2) northern California, located in San ,
Francisoo; and (3) Washington and Oregon. with main offices in Seattle.
Relooa~ion supervisors were placed in charge of each area, while 18
distric~ offices were established at principal localities within each
of the areas.
Administration of this new west coast relocation organization was
originally placed under the assistant director in the western field
office. It was presumed that the relocation problems of individuals
returning to the evacuated area would be different and would require 
different approach tlUU1 that used in the relocation organization else-
where. It was anticipated that there might be a wholesale rush of
evacuees back to their homes immedia~ely following the lifting of the
exclusion order, and the west coast organization was geared to slaw
down this expected rush and to conduct the return in as orderly a
fashion as possible. There was some apprehension as to how the return-
ing people would be received and most of the early effort on the Pacific
Coast following the lifting of the exclusion order was devoted to publio
relations.
However, a survey of ~he situation in April 1945 indicated that
most evacuees still residing in the centers were in no hurry to "return
to the evacuated area. This m.de necessary the application of a
vigorous program to st1mula~e resettlement ~o the Wes~ Coas~ S~ates,
similar to tha~ which had been necessary ~o induce relooa~ion eastward.
It had been learned, also, that the relocation job locally on the wes~
coast was essentially the same as in other parts of the country--that
1~ consisted of finding jobs and housing for resettlers as well as
securing favorable community acoeptanoe.
It was true that there was more discrimination and that more
people were rabidly anti-Japanese within the evaoucated area, but by
and large it was the same two-way selling job tha~ the Relooation
Division had experienced elsewhere--selling the residents of a given
area on accepting the evacuees. and selling the evacuees on leaving ~he
false security which the centers represented to them. Consequen~ly. the 1
west ooas~ administrative se~up was reorganized. The entire reloca~ion :
program was placed direc~ly under the Relocation Division in Washington
and with the same working arrangement as had been developed in other
relocation offices. Evaouee property controls at all levels were also
placed under the Relocation Division at Vtash1ng~on. Wi~h the west coast
area reopened, and with plans made for all residents to leave ~he
centers, property matters had for the first ~ime become directly
related to relooa~ion.
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ABANDON14ENT OF LEAVE CLEARANCE
Coincident with the reopening of the evacuated area and the
assumpttbn by the War Department of responsibi11 ty for determining who
among the evacuees should be subject to individual ~xolusion tram the
west coast. or subject to other control. the WRA abolished the leave
clearance (national security) provisions of its leave re"ulaticns. It
had been contemplated originally that the provisions of the leave regu-
lations relating to the issuanc~ of indefinite leave (i.e.. those
relating to communi ty acce~tance. means of support outside the center.
eto.) would be retained until January 20. 1945. The immediate elimi-
nation of the indefinite leave requirements was prompted by the action
of the Supreme Court in the Endo decision of December 18. 1944. The
Court found that WRA. had no authority to detain within a center any
concededly loyal citizen pending application for and issuance of leave.
After December 20. 1944. WRA acted only as agent for the War Department
! and the Department of Justice in holding in centers individuals placed
: in restrictive categories.
To assure that the return to the west c9ast would be orderly.
WRl relocation assistance (travel e~ense and further assis~ce where
necessary) was provided originally only where the evacuee had a WRA-
approved relocation plan. These regulations were established as a
safeguard agains~ the possibility that too large a number of evacuees
might return too rapidly to anyone community. An agreement between
WRA and the Department of Justioe was effected whereby aliens wo.uld not
be allowed tra~~el permits to communities where. in WRA's opinion.
returnees were arriving at a rate inconsistent with the public welfare.
It soon became apparent that these safeguards were unnecessary. and
they were eliminated.
BVACUEE ATTITUDES TOWARD RELOCATION
--
At first there was a general attitude of disbelief among center
residents regarding the WRA statement that all centers would close
wi thin a year. A small element of resentment appeared but there was no I
organized resistance to the policy. Resistance took the form of a wide-
spread tendency to grasp every indication Which could be taken to mean
that the centers--one or more of them--might remain open.
In order to emphasize the inevitability of liquidation and center
closing. the Authority stated its policy as ~requently as possible and
under many circumstances. The National Director visited each of the
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centers for that specific purpose, and while many people were spurred
into action, a considerable number remained content to let things drift.
Rumors gained credence in the centers that the Department of Justice was
opposing the plan to close all centers, and hopes grew that that Depart-
ment might be expected to continue two or three centers, at least, under
its own adminis~ration. Many center residents were honestly convinced
that the task the Authority had set itself to do was actually impossible
of achievement. Most of the appointed staff entered wholeheartedly into
the job of stimulating relocation and neither voiced nor showed any
reservations toward the final relooa~ion and liquida~ion plans. A
smaller percentage of the appointed s~aff, however, con~inued to oppose
relocation openly or indirectly because of their awn selfish desires to
remain in employment or because of excessive fears for the safety and
well-being of evacuees.
Relocation offices in the field and at the centers stepped up
their efforts in suggesting practical solutions to individual problems.
Information regarding specific localities was translated into Japanese
and abundantly distributed. Letters from successfully relocated indi-
viduals were reproduced and circulated at the centers.
Community government, which had attained a varying degree of
stability, prestige and influence at the centers, faced in 1945 the
important problems posed by the liquidation announcement. The com-
muni ty government organizations continued their usually helpful role
in assisting with center administration, but the major part of their
concern was the fact that total relocation had to be attained within
the year.
In February, an all-center evacuee conference was held to discus.
the liquidation potic~. Suggestion for the conference came from Topaz,
when that center's community council .ent invitations to the councils
of all the relocation centers to attend a meeting at Salt Lake City,
Utah, on February 16, 1945. Thirty representatives from seven centers
(Manzanar and Tule Lake did not participate) attended a week-long con-
ference in which a searching study was made of the problems facing
center residents.
The period between the revocation announcement and the time of
the conference was marked by inoreased activity of the various com-
munitycouncila. Extra sessions were called to discuss policies; com-
mittees appointed to work out details; surveys conducted in efforts to
determine the thoughts of the residents; individual block meetings
contributed their t~inking to center-wide opinions. As a result of
this council-sponsored activity, most of the representatives went to
Salt Lake City with the opinion that center residents would require more
assistance in relocation than WRA ~8 making available.
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Conferenoe sentiment tell into three groups. One group sought
to enlist the support ot various publio and private agencies, arguing
that it they could secure a sufficiently wide audience on the outside
they could obtain inoreased Government assistance. Another group
agitated for a vigorous demand for tull restitution of evacuation
losses before relocation. The third group favored resettlement, but
saw insurmountable diffioulties.
The first group gained control and were able to exert a con-
structive influence on the conference. They argued for increased relo-
cation assistance rather than a strongly-worded protest against center
closing. They oontended that evaouees who insisted they would not, or
could not, leave the center were the responsibility of WRA and not of
the evaouee groups.
Out of this meeting came a "statement of facts" as the evaouees
saw them, and a list of 21 reoommendations. The importanoe ot this
summation lay in the fact that it was considered by evacuee leadership
to be a restrained and generous statement of the minimum requirementsfor resettlement. It was designed for consumption by center residents, ,
by the public. and by WRA, Which to them represented the United states
Government.
The "statement ot facts~" Which formed a preamble to the recom-
mendations, was as follows:
1. Mental suffering has been caused by the forced mass
evacuation.
2. There has been an almost complete destruction of
tinancial roundations built during over a halt century.
3. Especially for the duration. the war has created
tears of prejudices. perseoution. etc., also fears of
physical violence and fears of damage to property.
4.. Many Issei (average age is between 60 and 65) were
depending upon their sons.tor assistance and support,
but these sons are serving in the United states armed
forces. Now these Issei are reluctant to consider
relocation.
5. Residents feel insecure and apprehensive towards
the many changes and modifications of WRA policies.
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6. The residents have prepared to remain for the
duration because of many statements made by the ?ffiA
that relocation centers will be maintained for the
duration of the vrar.
7. Many residents were forced to dispose of their
personal and real properties, business and agricultural
equipment, etc., at a mere trifle of their cost; also
they drew leases for the "duration6lt hence have nothing
to return to.
8. Practically every Buddhist priest is now excluded ",
from the west coast. Buddhism has a substantial fo1-
lowing 6 and the members obviously prefer to remain
where the religion centers.
9. There is an acute shortage of' housing6 which is
obviously a basic need in resettlement. The residents
fear that adequate housing is not available.
10. Many persons of Japanese ancestry have difficulty
in obtaining insurance coverage on life6 against fire,
on automobiles, on property, etc~
* * * . * * *
The Washington office gave each of the 21 recommendations made
by the conference careful consideratioli6 checking its liquidation policy
against the suggestions of the conference. The result was a document
entitled "'~iJRA Comments on Reyownendations of the All Center Conference."
It was adequately distributed in English and later in Japanese at all
centers.
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In general this document stated that solutions to atypical situ-
ations and problems would have tQ. be worked out on an individual basis
and could be met only as examples came to the attention of the Author-
ity. It explained how some of the suggestions were not feasible, While
I others were already an established part of V~M policy, sometimes in a
I form more generous than that requesteda It pointed to plans already
implemented for cooperation with existing Government and civic bodies,
i summarizing the definite. progress wh~ch had been made in reintegrating
I evacuees into American communities. This document answers at 1en~
so many of the questions existing at this time in the minds of center
residents that it is given in full below:
Recommendation No.1: That special governmental agencies or units be
established solely for providing assistance to evacuees who
mi~;ht require fUnds in reestablishing themselves.
a. Resettlement aid (grants).
b. Loans.
CoIIlJnent: l/We recognize that many of the evacuees now residing in the
centers ~~11 not be able to provide completely for their own
support on the outside and that others will need loans to re-
establish themselves in business or farndnge'nterprises. It
should be realized, ho'Y'lever, that the practical problem of
securing legislation and funds for a special agency is a very
real one and, even if desirable, would require much time to
acco~.p1ish. It seems h~gh1y unlikely that Congressional approv-
al could be secured for such a proposal, or that a special
agency is actually needed. As far as grants are concerned, both
public and private welfare agencies throughout the country now
have the lowest number of clients they have had in years and are
in excellent po.sition to furnish help for relocating evacuees
who need public assistance. 1Ioreover, the ViM has made specj.a1
arrangements to transfer fUnds as needed to the Social Security
Board for the ResettleII'.ent Assistance program Vlhich is designed
specifically to meet the needs of people (such as evacuees) who
have been affected by restricti.ve governmental action. Aid
under this program is available to both citizen and alien evac-
uees in all parts of the country regardless of previous resi-
dence. Yi~ wi1~,m8.ke every possible effort, throu~fl its field
offices and in otper ways, to see that adequate assistance is
promptly provided for handicapped resett1ers ,vho need grants or
other special kinds of help. FUller comment on.1oans is pro-
vided under No.3 below.
Recolr~e~dation No.2: That the present relocation grant be increased.
It shou.1d be given to every re1ocatee. tl~e penalty clause on
the present form should be deleted.
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Vie further recommend that federal aid be granted according to
every individual's particular needs until such time as he is
reestablished.
Cbmment: Relocation grants are now made available on the basts of need
and will continue to be. To provide each resettler ,vi th a grant
regar.dless of his cash resources would be an unwarranted use of
the taxpayers' money. The ~ants should be regarded not as a 
compensation or reward for relocating, but as a form of assist-
ance for those who temporarily lack sufficient cash resources
to reestablish themselves in private life.
The so-called "penalty clause" is included on the ~orm 
merely for the information of evacuees and is sts.ndard on all !
government forms of this type. I t is intended to warn the ap-
plicant against ~ving false information on the application.
The penalties for providing false information will apply whether
the clause is included on the form or not. In view of the rec-
ommendation of the conferees, however, the WRA has decided to
delete this clause from all future printings of the form.
In cases where the relocation grant provided by the 'l'i'RA
j.s not sufficient to cover an individual's needs until such time
as he reestablishes himself, supplementary assistance should be
sou~t under the ~esettlement Assistance Program from the appro-
priate local welfare agency. In view of the increased tempo of
relocation, Cbngress has been asked to increase the amount vrhich
may be transferred to the ~ocial Security Board for the Reset-
tlement Assistance Program between now and June 30,1945, and is
being asked to appropriate additional funds for this program to
cover the period throuBh June 30,1946.
.
Recolmnendation No. J: That long term loans at a 10'\'1 rate of interest
be made available, witl10ut security, to aid the residents in
reestablishing themselves as near as possible to their former
status in privs.te enterprises, such as business, agriculture,
fisheries, etc.
Comment: )\rnA is now exploring every potential source of loans--both
. governmental and private--for relocating evacuees.. Because of
the current inflation of valu.es, we believe that evacuees would
b~ ill advised to secure long-term loans for land purchase at
this part;cular time. Comparatively short-term loans for the
restocking of business enterprises, the purchase of agricultural
equipment and supplies, or other similar ~rposes, hoYfever, are
definitely needed by many evacuee businessmen and farrners. ~ntA
will bend eve~y effort to see that such loans are made available
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from some source to those wishing to reestablish themselves in
their pre-evacuation line of endea.vor. Evacuees at the centers
will be advised as further progress is made in locating poten-
tial credit sources.
Recommendation No.4: That the WRA use their good offices so that co~
sideration may be given on priority by CPA. Because of evacua-
tion, residents were forced to dispose of their equipment,
trucks, cars and so forth, many' of vmich at present require the
approval of an CPA Board. These equipments are essential to
! many residents in order to reestablish themselves in,former
I enterprises.
Comment: v\~ will render every possible assistance through the field
relocation offices to evacuees Who need help in obtaining agri-
cultural equipment. Since priorities are no longer necessary for
such equipment (except for crawler-type tractors), the field
offices will be concerned primarily with locating dealers or
individuals who have eq1jipment and who will sell to evacuee
operators. Evacuees, however, should not expect preferential
treatment or the granting of priori ties Which are not available
to other persons.
Recommenaation No.5: That the ViE! make every effort to obtain a retFn
of prope,rties for evacuees who, due tp evacuation and cohsequent
inability to maintain installment payments, have lost the same;
further, in order to prevent loss of property, to obtain some
definite arrangement for the granting of governmental aid, as
may be necessary, to evacuees unable, as a result of evacuation,
to maintain installment payments.
I Comment: There are undoubtedly a considerable number of evacuees who
have lost their properties or who are on the verge of losing
them because of inability to maintain installment payments.
Although' \'JRA is not in position to take any direct action in
such cases, it will assist evacuees, through its field' offices,
in trying to secure necessary refinancing from public or private
lending institutions.
Recommendation No.6: That the 'i\1RA give financial aid to residents
wi th definite plans, for the purposes of defraying the expenses
of investigating specific relocation possibilities.
Cb~ent: Assistance of this type is now available to evactiee repre-
sentatives designated by the Relocation Planning Commission for
the exploration of group relocation opportunities anYVfhere out-
side the Y~est COast area. This gives evacuees at the centers an
opportunity to acquire first-hand information from their own
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representatives about sections of the country with which they are
not familiar and provides a factual basis for evaluating reloca-
. tion prospects.
On the West Coast, however, there is not the same need
for exploI"atory trips of this type that there is in other sec-
tions of the country. The evacuees, after all, have a first-
hand knowledge of the coastal region--its agriculture, climate,
and economic opportunities. We believe that any investigative
trips center residents may wish to make in that region should be
at their own expense.
Recommendation No.7: That the V;~ establish adequately staffed offices
in important areas and employ persons of Japanese ancestry since
they understand Japanese psychology; and also establish in these
field offices, legal advisory and employment departments.
O:>mment: Area relocation offices have now been established covering
the entire United States. In the Pacific Coast section, there
are three area offices--San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle--
and 12 district relocation offices in active operation. Other
offices are being established so that we shall soon have a field
office in each section of the West Coast states wh~re there was
an important concentration of Japanese people before evacuation.
A number of Nisei are already employed at several of the
field offices both on the ~!jest Coast and alsewhere. In view of
the problem suggested by the conferees, however, 'we are also
planning in the near future to add one Issei,to the staff at a
number of the principal field offices. These persons will be
chosen because of their knowledge of the Japanese language as
well as their general ability as interviewers and negotiators.
At each of the area relocation offices on the Vfest Coast-
San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle--VffiA plans to have an
attorney on the staff who will render legal advice and counsel
to the returning evacuees. WRA is not in position to represent I
evacuee clients in-court cases, but will help evacuees to obtain f
necessary private counsel through the legal aid program which .
is already in operation.
Assistance in securing employment is available to the
evacuees through the United States Employment Service and the
various private groups which are cooperating in the relocation
program. "ffiA field offices are supplementing this service,
wherever necessary, and will continue. to do so.
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Recommendation No.8: That the V~RA continue the operation of evacuee
property offices for the duration, to fulfill the needs of
relocatees.
Comment: VffiA plans to continue operation of the evacuee property
offices on the liest Coast until April 2, 1946--or virtually up
until the time when the agency itself will go out of existence.
All relocating or returning evacuees are given a 6o-day period
(after leaving the center) within which to remove their pro~rty
from v~RA warehouses. In emer gency cases, applic ation may be
made to the appropriate field office for extension of this time
limit, but in no case beyond April 2,1946.
Recommendation No.9: That the w~ accept for reinduction into centers
those who relocate and who find themselves unable to make satis-
factory adjustments.
Comment: The policy governing visits to the l'elocatinn centers has now
been modified in such a way that all relocated 6Vacuees are per-
mitted two visits to the centers, totaling a maximum of not more
than 30 days, without the necessity of securing advance approvaL
We believe this new policy will largely alleviate the problem
suggested by the conferees. Vie are not prepared, however, to
reinduct as regalar center residents those persons who have left
the centers on indefinite leave or terminal departure. The
Resettlement Assistance Program is organized and has funds to
relieve the problems of those who meet adverse circumstances.
Through one means or another, we believe that reasonably satis-
factory adjustments can be worked out in all cases, and that
reinduction to the center would only postpone rather than solve
the adjustment problem which eventually must be faced.
Recommendation No. 10: That the VillA arrange for the establishing of
hostels and other facilities in various areas; and furthermore,
build new housing through the FHA, with 1~~ assistance.
Commen~: 'V.RA is encouraging church groups and other private organiza-
tions to establish evacuee hostels wherever needed and ?Iherever
appropriate facilities can be located. Hostels are nowoperat-
ing in Cleveland, Detroit, l~Qnneapolis, Brooklyn, Cincinnati,
Des Moines, Philadelphia, Viashington, Los Angeles, Oakland, and
San Jose. Every effort is being made to encourage the estab-
lishment of additional hostels in all the major cities of the
West Coast area. As part of this effort, we have recently com-
pleted arrangements under vmich equipment such as cots, mattres-
ses and kitchen utensils surplus to the needs of relocation
centers can be made available on a loan basis to approved
hostels in the Viest Coast states. One loan has already been made.
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In addition, I~~ is constantly working on the housing
problem from a number of other angles.
Recommendation No. 11: That the ¥JI~ provide transportation of evacuee
property door to door.
Comment: Careful consideration has been given to the feasibility of
providing this type of service. Hovlever, because of the large
number of deliveries that would be involved and the limited
~mber of ,IRA personnel available to work on property transporta-
tion, it was feared that provision of door-to-door transporta-
tion mi8ht become a serious bottleneck in the relocation program
and an inconvenience to evacuee resettlers. Vie believe that the
whole program will move more rapidly and satisfactorily if evac-
uees make their own arrangements for picking up property at the
nearest railhead and having it delivered to their homes. In
cases where an evacuee needs money to pay for the trucking
service, application should be made to the appropriate welfare
agency for a special grant to cover this item.
Recommendation No. 12: That the ';.M negotiate for the establishing of
old people's homes exclusively for persons of Japanese ancestry.
Comment: The VillA is now exploring vii th a number of public and private
agencies the problem of providing adequate care for the older
evacuees who have no means of support.. We believe that it will
be poss,ible, through old age assistance and other types of pub-
lic assistance, to work this problem out without the necessity
for establishing an old peoples' home exclusively for those of
Japanese descent.
Recommendation No. 13: That the ~~RA make negotiations to arrange (1) so
that evacuees formerly civil service employees will be rein-
stated and (2) so that persons of Japanese -ancestry will be able
to secure business licenses as formerly.
Comment: Evacuees who are seeking reinstatement on former State or
local civil service jobs in the evacuated area and those who
wish to obtain business licenses should simply apply to the
appropriate State or local agency. If any undue difficulties
are experienced, the case should be reported in detail to the
nearest l~RA field office, vlhich will make every effort to work
out a satisfactory solution.
Recommendation No. 14: That short term leave regulations be changed to
permit an absence of two months with one month extension privi-
le~s. Also, that the evacuee investigating relocation possi-
bilities be permitted to become employed, without change of status.
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Comment: This, of course, would be tantamount to reinstituting the
seasonal leave program under another name. Our experiences with
seasonal leave have convinced us that it would not be feasible
at this late stage in the ~ffiA program. Adjustment of evacuees
to private life will be far easier if the wage earners in the
group start turning their thou@1ts away from the centers and
begin making arrangements as soon as possible to bring their
dependents out to normal communities.
It is our policy to grant an additional .3O-day short
term leave in cases where it has been established that more
time is needed. It should also be understood that if an individ-
ual on short-term leave wishes to take employment while on short-
term leave, he may do so without losing any of the financial or
other assistance which WRA provides for him or his family. If
employment is taken, the individual would of course automatically
enter the status of terminal departure.
Recommendation No. 15: That when an evacuee relocates or returns to his
former busiRess or home, WRA should make every effort to release
frozen assets (blocked accounts), both in cases of individuals
or organizations.
<bmment: Those evacuees who'have been cleared by the War Department
for retu~n to their former homes stand an excellent chance of re-
gaining their frozen as~ets or blocked accounts. V,'RA has 81-
ready been ne gotiating with the Treasury Department on this
problem and will soon announce procedures for presenting appli-
cations to the proper officials for consideration. It is su~-
gested that the Community Councils inform those whose funds are
frozen,or blocked to take their problems to the Projeqt Attorney
and secure his assistance in preparing applications for clear- 
ance and his advice on clearance and licensing procedures. 
Recommendation No. 16: That the \\~ negotiate for the concluqing of
arran~ments whereunder alien parents may be able to operate or
rruanase properties with powers of attorney issued by their chil-
dren, particularly by sons in the United States Armed Forces.
<bmment: We are investigating this matter and will provide further
information at a later date.
Recommendation No~ 17: That the v'.R.A arrange to secure outr.ight re-
leases for parolees who relocate.
~mment: Parolees who have relocated and desire to be released from
parole restrictions should apply to the Enemy Alien Control Unit
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of the Department of Justice. Persons making such application
should submit axv factual information they may have bearing
upon their loyalty to the United States and their willingness to
cooperate in the war effort. This would include: (a) names and
designations ~f any sons and daughters who are serving in the
armed forces with their approval,(b) statements from friends,
acquaintances or colleagues, and (c) any additional information
they may have bearing on the continuation of their parolee
status. WRA will be glad, upon the request of an individual
parolee, to submit any information it may have regarding his
character and loyalty, to the Department of Justice.
Recommendation No. 18: That the VIi"RA obtain the establishment of some
avenue of governmental indemnities for relocatees Who may be-
come victims of anti-Japanese violence in terms of personal
injuries or property damage.
Comment: The law-enforcement agencies of the ¥jest Coast States and
the United States Department of Justice have given every pos- 
sible assurance that returning evacuees will be protected, and
these agencies have taken positive and rapid action in the
isolated cases that have thus far arisen. It is our considered
opinion that the opposition to the return of evacuees now being
voiced on the West Coast by certain small cliques is largely
bluffing. VJhile there have been several cases of attempted
violence, every effort has been made to bring the culprits to
justice, and this procedure will be continued.
If evacuees should suffer any damage or injury, they
have the same rights as any other person to seek compensation
in the courts from the persons causing the loss. If the evao-
uees.need additional money protection, there is insurance to
cover almost any kind of risk. vr:lA. will assist center residents
upon request in obtaining insurance for themselves and for their
,property to cover any risks of damage that they think tUght
occur after relocation. We are entirely confident that cover-
age can be obtained.
Federal legi~lation would be necessary to provide indem-
nities of the sort suggested by Recommendation No. 18. Vie know
of no similar Federal legislation that has been passed by
Cbngress. In view of the fact that no similar special consid-
eration has been given to other persons or groups, the presumed
adequacy of local law-enforcement agencies to handle any
problem, and the other avenue~ available to evacuees to seek
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compehsation or protect themselve.s in advance, it seems
extremely doubtful that Congress would give favorable consider-
ation to the proposal.
Recommendation No. 19: That the WRA arrange for adequate government
compensation .against losses to evacuee property by fire, theft,
etc. while in ~vernment or private storage or while in transit.
Comment: ~"iRA has not been ~iven authority by Congress to pay claims
of this sort. In one type of case--where property has been
lost, destroyed, or damared as a result of the negligence of
~~overnment employees--claims can be filed against the govern-
ment up to :$1,000 under the Small Claims Act of 1922. Through
well-established channels -viRA may submit such claims to the
Congress for consideration. The evacuee Property Officers and
the l~roject Attorneys at the relocation centers can give
evacuees complete inforraation with respect to the filing of
claims under this law.
~here property has been ~amaged while in transit, claims
can and should be filed in every case against the transporta-
tion company. The accountability of railroads and other car-
riers for property \vhich they transport is very strict and most
claims involving damage to evacuee property while in transit
would like1.y be paid by the carriers involved.
We realize, of course, that these two remedies cover
only part of the problem. In the case of acts of vandalism
a~ainst evacuee property in private storage it has not been
I ' possible in most cases to identify the vandals, despite the
, thorough investigation that is required by \~RA procedures. It
- must be pointed out, however, that all evacuees.were given the
option of storing their property with the government free of
charge Where it would be appropriately guarded. Since the
evacuees had this option Congress might well regard any loss
to .be a risk that the evacuees knowingly assumed. There may
also be other types of cases in which loss has been sustained
through no fault of the evacuee which ~y not be recoverable
either as a legal or practical matter. ViEA is now issuing
instructions requiring all field offices to make full investi-
gations and report~ on cases involving damaGe. or loss to
evacuee property so. that the facts will be of record in
government files.
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Recommendation No. 20: That the V,R! arrange to provide students of
Japanese ancestry vii th adequate protection in case of need, and
opportunities equal to those enjoyed by Caucasian students.
<k>nnnent: Since the school systems at all centers' (except 'rule Lake)
are fUlly accredited in the States vvhere the centers are located,
we antici1:>ate no difficulty concerning credits in connection
with the transfer of evacuee students to the ordinary public
schools outside the centers. In the\iest Coast area special
efforts have been made to see that the transition of evacuee
students back to the public schools is a smooth and satisfac-
tory one. The Superintendents of Public Instruction in all
three of the Pacific Coast States have assured us that they
vall do everything possible to assist in satisfactory adjust~ent
of the returning evacuee students. Information kits, explain-
ing fully the school program at relocation centers and the
status of returning evacuees, have been placed in the hands of
all local school superintendents in California and will probably
be distributed in the near future to similar officials in
Yiashington and Oregon. Should any returning evacuee students
experience undue difficulties, the tRA field offices will
render every possible assistance in worki~g out a satisfactory
adjustment.
Recommendation No. 21: That the V,UA make every effort to secure work
opportunities for returnees and relocatees on equal basis with
Caucasian citizens, particularly in reference to admittance into
labor unions.
Comment: Vie have already been working on this problem throurp the
field offices and will intensify our efforts. Of course, the
best argument vie have in convincing employers or union officials
that equal treatment should be accorded the evacuees is the
general attitude and work record of the evacuees themselves.
No preferential treatment should be expected, but equal treat-
ment will be the goal of all our negotiations.
* * * * ..~ * * 
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PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON THE WEST COAST
Early west coast reaction to the liquidation policy--more
specifically the fact that evacuees were going to return to their
homes--presented what many believed to be a more serious problem than
the initial refusal a~ the centers to accept~ at face value~ the faot
that ~he cen~ers'were going ~o be olosed.
A foretas~e of opposition to ~he forthcoming return ~ocurred
drama~ically in November 1944 a~ Hood River~ Oreg.~ where ~he looal .
chapter of ~he American Legion oaused ~he names of 16 Nisei ~o be
erased from ~he memorial bearing ~he names of all servicemen from ~he
communi~y. Hood River is ~he oen~er of a prosperous agricultural com-
munity which had a prewar Japanese segment equalling abou~ 12 pel~cent
of its population. Opposition within the evaouated area against the
i people of Japanese descent had become organized and vocal following
the evacua~ion. But removal of ~he nwmes~ al~hough the act simply
reflected a phase of that sentiment~ was particularly ill-timed for
I the purposes of the opposition. It came at a time when there was a
growing knowledge in ~his country of the figh~ing record being made by
Nisei troops in Italy. Stories of their exploits had been recorded in
War Department dispatches and published in newspapers everywhere.
Because of the dramatic injustice and flagrantly racial basis o£ the
looal Legion action~ it was possible to stimUlate the interest of the
press in general. For 3 months.~ colunmists~ editorial writers~ and
radiQ speakers across the count~ condemned the Hood River Legion post.
In the glare of this national spotlight~ and after oonsiderable pushing
by national Legion headquarters~ ~he Hood River post restored the names.
This inoident gave news value of national impor~anoe to a situa-
tion which threatened to spread up and down the coas~. The names were
back on the memorial~ but Hood River remained as determined as ever
that the evacuees would not return. Societies were or~anized for tha~
express purpose. Full page an~i-evaouee advertisements signed by Hood
River citizens were run in local papers. Meetings were oalled where
speakers repeated many of the old myths regarding people of Japanese
ances,try. The eoonomic boycott was in full swing. Evacuees were
advised to sell their land. They were blun~ly told that they were not
wanted back; tha~ they would not be able to opera~e their orchards
profitably because they would be unable to purchase equipment, supplies
and the neoessities of life.
But friends of the Japanese Awericans also were active. A hand-
rul of Hood River citizens who believed in fair play and individual
rights~ and who dared to express their conviotions~ pegan to be heard.
They formed a Hood River Citizens' League Which printed its own
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advertisements. telling the evacuees that they could legally come back
and that they would receive the protection afforded by law. They
actively campaigned for the support of the merchants of the vallgy in
counteracting the damage done to the area by race prejudice. Growing
in numbers and in strength. and backed by national press interest in
the valley and the fact that people had begun to talk about a national
boycott against their fwmous Hood River apples. this group started a
move to break the anti-evacuee economic boycott which was beginning to
spread to other ooast oities.
This economic boycott was strongest around Portland and Seattle
although it extended to certain rural areas in California. For example.
one evacuee and his family returned to their farm near Maryhill. Wash~.
Where prior to the war he had operated one of the largest fruit and
produce farms in the mid-Columbia area. According to the Portland
Oregon Journal of March 7: 
"Although his truck was loaded with vegetables which are
now fairly scarce. R. Tsubota. the first (!eturnell Japa-
nese grower and marketer to take his produce to the East
Side Farmer's wholesale market * * * took his truck home
Monday with between half and two thirds of' the vegetables
still in it * * * .
"He had 100 crates of parsnips and took 40 back. From
his 30 crate& of turnips he sold seven. He returned
with 20 of his 80 crates of young onions. All three
vegetables are hard to find now * * . ."
Investigation sh~led that anti-Japanese groups had brought
pressure to bear on the buyers. threatening a boycott if they purchased
from Japanese.
Similar treatment was experienced by other evacuees. and WRA
assigned a marketing specialist to help meet the problem. Through the
help of the Portland Citizen's Co~ttee and WRA, private outlets were
secured for Japanese-grown produce. By the end of June 1945, marketing
difficulties in Portland were pretty well smoothed out.
Beginning shortly after revocation, a wave of terroristic inoi-
dents broke out in California. They were concentrated in the agri-
cultural valleys. but extended to coastal communities. About 30 serious
incidents involving !l.rson. shooting attempts. and threatening visits had
occurred by June 30.1945. with numerous minor demonstrations such as
rook throwing, threats. or intimidations.
i~ met these incidents aggressively. Each separate case was
reported in full not only to the national press. but to the office of
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the state attorney general. The theory was that the American public is
essentially fair-minded and would demand that justice be done according .
to established principles of fair play.
As time passed and the evacuees were backed by national public
opinion, and as a generally more sympathetic attitude developed on the
part of local law epforcement officials, terroristic efforts to stop
the return gradually subsided. Terrorism almost completely disappeared'
within a few weeks after Secretary Ickes issued a press release on
May 14 concerning the incidents, which at that time numbered 15 shoot-
ing attacks, 1 dynamiting attempt, 3 cases of arson and 5 threatening
visits. Commenting in forceful language on the pattern of terrorism,the Secretary stated: '
"The shameful spectacle of these incidents of terrorism
taking place at the back door of the San Francisco Con-
ference, now in session to develop means by which men of
all raoes oan live together in peace, must be ended onoe
and for all. I believe that an arous ed na ti anal opinion,
rooted in the indignation of fair-minded Americans through-
out the country, will be a powerful aid to West Coast state
and local officials charged with bringing the vigilante
criminals to justice."
WELFARE PRO B l.E}.fS
Early in the relocation program, it had been realized that there
were residents at all centers whose resettlement would require public
assistance in one form or another, in some instances temporary, in
others oontinuing. This problem had been partially met in advance by
development of a procedure under which certain funds were supplied to
the. Social Security Board for use in providing needy evacuees with
assistance which was not available from regular sources. This procedure,
known as the Resettlement Assistance Program, was utilized very infre-
quently during 1943 and 1944, primarily because the people who relocated
during that period were, in general, people who did not need that kind
of assistance.
I
I
Most of the evacuees who might be expected to require public
assistance were still in the centers at the beginning of 1945. Due to
the immigration pattern, the Japanese segment of the population showed
an unusually heavy concentration in the age groups above 40 and below
30, with a small representation within the 30- to 40-year bracket.
Prior to revocation, and to a considerable extent during the subsequent
6 months, it was preponderantly the young, vigorous Nisei who relocated.
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For them the problem of public assistance was likely to arise only in
cases of sudden illness or accident Which could impair their earning
power.
Prior to the evacuation, this country's Japanese population had
been traditionally self-supporting. Prewar records shaw a negligible
number who had applied for public assistanoe. But the evacuation and
3 years in the centers had produced a drastic change in the economic
picture. Real and personal property, and farm and business equipment
had often been sold at a considerable loss. Fire and vandalism
accounted for loss of a great deal of tangible property which had been
privately stored. And, in many instance3, savings had been completely
dissipated during 3 years in a center.
Many of the older center residents were bachelors who had been
tenant farmers, share croppers or migrant workers. Some of these men
had establ'ished a measure of economic security before the war, but
many would undoubtedly have become dependnat on public assistance even
had the evacuation not taken place. Loss of employer contacts, deple-
tion of savings, and 3 more years in age reduced most of this group of
unattached old men to a point from which they could not be expected to
reestablish themselves. In addition to these and other aged persons
and groups without resources, other types of continuing dependency
were found among the center residents, just as they would be in any
other considerable group of people. The chronically ill, unattached
children, the physically and mentally handicapped, and persons in
similar categories were likely to require continuing aid. The liRA
presumed that state and county of legal residence would assume respon-
sibility. In general, the public welfare organizations 'of California,
Washington, Oregon, and Arizona did assume these responsibilities
wi thout question. The few exceptions were a small number of inland
counties in California, whioh placed what difficulties they could in
the way of returning dependency cases. Even in these counties, with
the assistance of the State welfare department, the Authority was
successfu~ in securing adequate looal public assistance for returning
residents'.
Because relocation of welfare cases would require more adminis-
trative time and effort than would be required for the average evacuee
family, a large part of WRA's attention throughout the period was given
to assisting persons in this classification. The centers were combed
early in the year in an effort to determine the exact nature and
number of welfare oases. Then began a continuing process of describing
the needs of the evacuees to local welfare agencies, and making known
to the evacuees the various types of aid that were available. Dependent
persons were ordinarily expected to return to their place of legal resi-
dence. In exceptional instanoes Where there were sound social or
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family reasons for resettlement elsewhere. every assistance possible
was given. and strong efforts were made to secure acceptance for these
persons in the community of their choioe. despite lack of legal resi-
dence for welfare purposes. Resettlement assistance under the Social
Seourity Board was available ~o meet the welfare needs of these in-
migrants into communi ties in which they would not be eligible for local
welfare assistance. Most communities were found willing to accept a
limited number of such cases.
Complete case histories of individual dependent families were
prepared in the centers and sent to the WRA area office in the locality
in which the family indicated the greatest relocation interest.
One of the chief delays encountered was in verification of
individual residenoe in California. where a 3-year county residence was
required before aid could be given from county funds. Occasionally it
was not possible to verify county residence for the 3 years immediately
preceding the war. Many Issei bachelors, in following their migratory
work. had lived in several coun~ies. Many could recall living in a
certain town during a particular period. but could not recall the exact
street address. The consequent searching for residence dat. caused
delay in relocation. Because of the delays, by September 15 the centers
were advised to return evacuees to the community from which they were
evacuated in instances where they had been unable to verify county
residence. In such cases, Social Security resettlement as~sta~oe funds
could be used while verifying residence.
Shortly after the lifting of the exolusion order, it became
apparent that there existed a considerable need for temporary aid in
procuring essential household goods. in meeting the first month's rent.
and for suoh other initial expenses as transportation of household and
personal effects from railhead to residenoe. These expenses ~ould not
be met from the $25 per person relocation assistance grant. but could
be paid for through the Social Seourity resettlement assistanoe program.
This did not work out too well because of the extreme variation in
standards in the use of resettle~nt assistance funds by local. welfare
agencies. Because WRA had complete records on individuals and could
establish a uniform standard, the resettlement assistance program was
modified, effeotive June 1.1945. Under this modified plan, WRA began
making grants directly., rather than through the Social Security Board
and local agencies, to relocating families at the centers Who needed
temporary aid in reestablishing households during the initial adjustment
period. The Social Security Board, through the State and local welfare
agencies, continued to provide for all other types of emergencies or
continuing assistance that might be needed by resettlers. An advantage
of the new system was that families needing temporary assistance during
I(69)
the adjustment period could know before leaving the center just how
much they would receive and make their plans accordingly. It
definitely gave extra assurance to those families most in need of
such assistance. 
HOUSING
Perhaps the most difficult single .problem posed by the liquida-
~ion process was that of housing for returnees. Housing was a difficult
problem in all parts of the country, but it was particularly difficult
on the west coast at the time evacuees were returning. Throughout the
war there had been tremendous influx of new workers into that part of
the country. In the first half of 1945 there had occurred a shifting
of war activities to the west coast as the European war neared it~ end,
and war efforts were increasingly directed toward the Pacific. Most of
the comparatively few center residents who had owned their own homes on
the west coast had retained title to them, but quite often it was diffi-
cult to obtain possession. V/here these homes were rented, it was neces-
sary to follow CPA evic~ion proceedings, and so~ evacuees were hesitant
to evic~ for fear such evictions migh~ have adver~e publio relations
effect. Others found their property had been vandalized, and encoun-
tered difficulty and delay in effecting repairs. The large majority
of returnees simply required some sort of shelter which they could rent.
. Slums, which had housed many in "Little Tokyos,.' were now occupied by
others; flimsy shacks, formerly occupied by farm workers, were beyond
repair or were already in use.
Immediately after the lifting of the exclusion order, extraor-
dinary efforts were put forth by friendly groups in California to
establish hostels to provide temporary housing tor returnees. The
hostel movement had started early in the relocation program but was
vastly expanded during this period. The liar Relocation Authority
assigned part of its staff to stimulate and assist local clubs, church
groups, and sometimes individual evacuees, to operate these refuges,
which were planned as nonprofit rooming houses. In order to serve the
greatest number. some hostels placed a limit on the length of time
individuals could remain. Increase in rates after a specific p,eriod
was another effective method of controlling this time factor. As
liquidation progressed, the west coast hostels became an integral part
of the program. Many of the most successful operators were returned
ministers of various denominations who secured churches, schools, or
other buildings and established hostels. To further encourage this
. movement, the Authority initiated in April a policy of lending necessary
equipment. Loans included suoh needed item8 as chairs, beds. mattres~
china. and cooking utensils. The Authority stipulated that hostels
using this equipment should be open to all evacuees. By June 30, some
50 hostels were operating in 25 cities over tfie country, nearly all of
them in the area which had been evacuated. By the end of the year, .
there were 110 hostels in operation in California alone. Vlhile some
of these hostels could be classed as little more than shelters and
offered only a temporary solution to the housing of returnees, they
made it possible for them to return to their home communities to .seek
employment and permanent housing.
West coast field offices also concentrated on finding employment
opportunities which would include housing. Perhaps the outstanding
achievement of this type was accomplished in the San Jose district,
where a large influential growers' association purchased considerable
demountable housing which was transported to farma of association
members and set up there to house returning evacuees.
Efforts were also made by church and other friendly groups to 
canvass in many localities and neighborhoods for individual families. 
While some housing was found in this manner, the result compared with
the effort was disappointing. Individual evacuees were sometimes able
to find housing for friends and relatives, and there was evidence of
great responsibility being shown wi thin the group toward mutual aid in
housing. In many instances returned evacuees took other evacuee
families into their homes. Efforts to secure housing in advance of
the arrival of the returnee to the community were generally fruitless,
although various attempts were made to accomplish this.
During this period, closer liaison was established with the
National Housing Agency and two of its constituent agencies, the Federal
Public Housing Authority and the Federal Housing Administration, both in
Washington and in their regional and district offices.
Discussions were held with the head of the National Housing
Agency shortly before the lifting of the exclusion order, and inquiry
was made as to whether or not it would be possible to set up a special
program for the housing of evacuees returning to the west coast. The
Authority's representatives were advised that the National Housing
Agency was having a difficult time providing the housing needs for war
workers and the armed forces, and it would be opposed to any type of
special program which called for the use of special funds to provide
housing for evacuees. As housing was one of the limiting factors in
the west coast war effort, the head of the National Housing Agency
stated that he believed that there was absolutely no chance for obtain-
ing the legislation needed for special evacuee housing. The cooperation
of Federal housing agencies was promised, however, within the frwnework
of the regular housing pattern existing on the west coast.
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~Al though the NHA and the FPHA expressed their wi llingness to 
help. they were limited in their ability to be of assistance because of
provisions in the Lanham Act. stating that only war workers were eligi-
ble to occupy war housing. Early in July. however. the Congress passed
an amendment to the Lanham Act which put families of servicemen and
veterans on a parity 'Hi th war workers for eligibility for war housing.
Because of the large number of Nisei soldiers and veterans. it was
anticipated that this amendment would be of some help in housing
resettlers.
V-J Day on August 14 brought immediate cancellation of war
contr,acts and suspension of war production. and the National Housing
Agency on August 29 issued new instructions concerning eligibility to
occupy war housing. These provided that "distressed families without
housing who have been dislocated or displaced as a result of the war or
its orderly demobilization may also be admitted as an aid to the orderly
demobilization of the war effort.'. Evacuees were made eligible by this
order. and the west coast regional housing authorities agreed to do
everything in their power to assist evacuees to take advantage of these
new regulations. In Vlashington and Oregon. the National Housing
Administration actually assumed responsibility for housing returnees
and succeeded in providing housing for large numcers of them. This
solved the major problems in these two states.
As early as June it had become apparent that the Authority would
, have to take some extraordinary measures to meet the housing crisis in
a few of the California districts. Consequently. the Chief of the
.Relocation Division went to the west coast the first of July to explore
all possibilities for housing. Renewed emphasis Vias placed on the
acquisition of suitable hostels. A general survey was made of all
Army, Navy. and Coast Guard installations with the hope of obtaining
sufficient temporary barracks to solve the problem in the more crucial
areas. It was found that the Fourth Air Force was starting to give up
a nuwber of small installations all up and down the west coast.
properties which had been used for the housing of antiaircraft and air
defense squadrons. Surveys were made of these installations and
requests submitted to the War Department for their acquisition either
on a permit to use or by outright purchase. The Western Defense
Command installations. as well as the Ninth Service Command instal-
lations, were also surveyed as possibilities. By late July sufficient
installations had been located in the San ~Tancisco Bay area and in the
Los Angeles area to meet the m03t immediate needs. However. the
Authority experienced considerable difficulty in negotiating the
acquisition of these installations. In some instances, the owners 6f
the property on which the installations w.ere located had been tyring
for months to recover the~r property and objected strenuously to its
use by another Government agency, especially one which proposed to
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house returning evacuees. In other J.nstances, comIIU1nities in vtlich the
installations were located opposed the use of the installations for
housing evacuees. Finally, the iVestern Defense CoIIUnand turned over to
, the liar Relocation Authority the first big block of temporary housing.
This was located at South Fort Funston, a part of the San Francisco
Harbor defense system. Sufficient barracks were turn~d over to the
Authority there to house approximately 500 persons. Shortly thereafter,
the Lomita Air Strip in Los Angeles County was turned over to the
Authority on a permit to use. This installation was capable of housing
approximately 500 persons. Soon thereafter, five other installations,
located in Los Angeles County, were purchased from the Army Engineers.
These installations had a total capacity of approximately 700 persons.
The Santa Ana Air Base in Or~nge County provided, on a permit to ~se,
sufficient barracks to house more than the number of residents returning
to Orange County. The Army Air Transport Command in Sacramento turned
over sufficient barracks at Camp Kohler to house returnees needing
housing in Sacramento.
At the same time these barracks were.being acquired, the
~uthority negotiated an agreement with the Federal Public Housing
Authority in San Francisco to take 100 veterans or service-connected
families into public housing in San Francisco, 100 families in the Los
Angeles area, and 25 families in the San Diego area. At the same time,
the Federal Public Housing Authori~ agreed to make available dormi-
tories at Hunters Point in San Francisco sufficient to house 800
persons, and in Marin County, just across the Bay, sufficient dormi-
tories to take care of 1,000 persons. The FPHA entered into an agree-
ment to manage, on a reimbursable basis for liRA, all the temporary
housing which it had, acquired. This agency also agreed to convert the
barracks into temporary family living quarters at yvRA expense..
In general these steps went a long way toward solving the
immediate housing crisis. Although the situation remained very acute'
in Los lUigeles County, the FPHA finally agreed to loan more than 450
unused trailers to be used to supplement housing at five of the exist-
ing Army installations. -With the acquisition of these trailers,
sufficient housing was in sight to meet the temporary needs of all
residents returning to the county who did not have other housing
resources.
Planning for the housing needs for the evacuees was complicated
considerably by the fact that many evacuees used the housing crisis as
an excuse for not relocating. In a survey made of San Francisco Bay
residents who wished to return, over 2,100 stated that they could not
return unless hou~ing was furnished. Consequently, arrangements were
made at Fort Funston, Hunters Point, and Marin City dormitories to house
approximately 2,100 people. When relocation to that area was completed,
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only 800 had moved in~o ~he housing provided. In the San Diego area,
ou~ of 110 families indicating tha~ ~hey needed emergency housing,
only abou~ 15 moved in~o the housing provided. I~ was apparent ~ha~
many evacuees had housing in sigh~ prior to the survey of housing
requiremen~s, bu~ had hopes of obt~ining bet~er or cheaper housing.
When it was found that the Federal housing was not better or cheaper,
~he evacuees turned to their awn resources. An a~temp~ was made to
~ind Army housing in other oi ties along the coast and in inland com-
munities. Many ins~allations were located and could have been used, 
but were not needed. There w~re a few rural areas where no housing. 
resources could be found, and in these instances many evacuees requested
the loan of tents. The Authority borrowed 250 tents from the Army and
loaned most of these in rural communi~ies, pending the time the evacuees
could erect or find their own housing.
By the time the last relocation center was closed on November 30.
approximately 250 ve~erans or service-connected families had moved into
public housing; approximately 100 persons were in Camp Kohler,
Al.or~nto; 100 in Fort Funston, San Francisco; 100 in the Santa Ana
Air Base; 2,000 in the six temporary instaUa~ions in Los Angeles
Coun~y; and in addition to this, approximately 4,000 were in hos~els.
TRANSPORTATION
Because or ~he generally critical transportation situation,
careful and detailed plans were £ormulated for transpor~ing the evacuees
from the centers to their des~inations. In conferences wi~h the O£fice
of Defense Transportation and the American Assooiation of Railroads,
plans were ~de £or the use of special cars along regularly scheduled
runs, as well as special trains to definite points on fue wes~ coast.
In mid-July, 417 people le£t Rohwer on a special train that had been
ahartered by the center to take evacuees back to variou8 poin~s in
California. This was ~he £irst special ~rain movement, and the £irst
mass movement o£ re~urnees ~o the evacua~ed area. It was anxiously
wa~ohed by both WRA personnel and evacuees, par~icularly in regard
~o i ~s effec~ on public relations and communi ty sen timen~ on ~he wes~
coa8~. Many persons. bo~h within and outside of ~he Au~ho~i~y, had
advised against such large scale arrivals, fearing tha~they migh~
occasion large scale public opposi~ion. The ~rain lef~ Rohwer amid
a great deal of excitement both among ~he ~ravelers and among ~hose
whom they were le.aving behind. During a stop-over in s~. Louis, the
local resettlers commi~~ee and representa~ive evacuees now living in
S~. Louis "met the train and provided sigh~seeing ~rips and en~er~ain-
men~ £or the travelers. Reception oommi~tees also welcomed the
evacuees a~ ~heir des~inations and provided transporta~ion for ~hem to
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hostels or to their homes. There was no disturbance 9r incident any-
where along the way, and this first special train movement was adopted
as a pattern for many similar mass move~nts in the months to come.
Group movements were thereafter encouraged by the Authority, especially
as it was discovered that many evacuees were actually afraid to make
the return trip alone,. but lost this fear when travelling and arriving
at their destinations in'groups. The chartering of suoh special trains
and coaches in addition to making the completion of the relocation
program a physical possibility, gave a tremendous psychological 'impetus
to relocation. The railroads gave complete cooperation to the kAthority
by providing the needed equipment for group movements. With the shift
of the war effort to the Pacific, the demands on the western railroad.
had reached unprecedented heights. Only their efficienoy and oooper-
ation enabled the Authority to carry out its program on schedule.
PROGRESS OF RELOCATION
Up to June 1945, the relocation, movement had continued to be
predominately to the East and Middle West, but by the end of June, the
movement to the west coast began to equal that toward the east. It
soon beoame evident that large numbers, if not the majority of the
people remaining in the centers, had definite plans to return to the
west coast# but were hesitant to be among the first to return. At the
same time# there was evidence from the evacuated area that many of the
former employers of the evacuees were ,eager to employ them# but that
they, too, hesitated to be the first to act. This log jam had to be
broken. WRA oould not afford to have everyone wait until the last to
relocate. Transportation facilities would not be adequate for such a
large movement within so short a time # and the WRA staff would not be
able to handle all the required details if "the movements were not spaced
out.
At the beginning of 1945 When the mass exclusion order ~~s
lifted, there were still 79,770 people living in relocation centers.
It had been expected that the mOvement out of the centers for relocation
would be relativelr slow up to ~ or June because it was believed that
nany families wi ~ children would wish to remain until the end of the
spring school te1,~. It was also anticipated that after June there would
be large numbers of people relocating steadily throughout the s1muner.
A part of these expectations were borne out. Following the liquidation
announcement, the number of people leaving the centers rose steadily
from approximately 200 to about 700 a week. During the second week in
June # this number rose to 1#300 a week# but in the weeks following, the
movement dropped back to 800 people ~ week~ In the first 6 months or the
year # 17,485 people had relocated# leaving 62,558 still living in the
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centers. Of this number. about 18.000 were considered "unre10catabl~"
because of Department of Justioe or Army detention orders affecting
them or their families. This left over 44.000 to reloca.te before the
centers were to close.
One reason for the reduotion in movement from the centers in
June was that i t ~d become known among center residents that certain
individuals in the Department of Justice were advocating continuance of
at least a few oenters. This knowledge of a ,difference of opinion
within the Government in regard to the Authority's plans to liquidate
relocation centers led many residents to defer making plans to leave
in hope that they would not have to do so.
SCHEDULING DEPARTURES
It was evident that most people still remaining in the centers
were planning to stay until the last possible moment. It was also
recognized that there were much smaller numbers of persons presenting
real problems in regard-to their relocation.
In order to prevent a final residue as well as to adjust to
transportation and housing problems. WRA initiated a series of steps
calculated to effect terminaI departure of all residents.
Announcement was made on June 22 that Units II and III at
Colorado River (Poston) Relooation Center and the Canal Camp at Gila
River were to be closed in September. and that the residents were not
to be moved to another oenter or to the remaining camps at Poston and
Gila River. but must relocate.
An interviewing program was initiated to secure definite
information on three questions Which were addressed to all residents:
Vihere do you plan to go? When do you plan to go? What assistance will
you need? With this information. administrative plans could be made
both within the centeTR and at point of re10oation.
On July 13. closing dates for all relocation oenters were
announced. Granada Relocation Centsr was to close on October 15;
Minidoka and Central utah, November 1; Gila River and. Heart Mountain,
l~ovember 15; Colorado River and Manzanar, December 1; and Rohwer
Relocation Center, December 15.
An additional step emphasizing the finality of center closure
plans was ourtailment of operations and services. Sinoe conditions
varied considerably among the eight centers, authority to determine
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Which services or operations should be curtailed or eliminated, and
when, was largely left to project directors. Standards on Which
decisions were to be based were outlined as follows!
1. Serv~ces or operations that interfere with the relo-
cation of the residents, or that postpone such relocation.
shall be curtailed or eliminated as soon as possible.
Services or operations that advance such relocation may
be continued as long as they are necessary.
2. Services or operations that have no appreciable
effect on relocation shall be curtailed or eliminated
as the declining population of the centers no longer
warrants their continuance. makes their administration
difficult, or increases administrative costs.
At the same time. the Authority announced the scheduling of
dependency cases for departure from the center. The objectives were
set forth as followsl
Dependent families who have been accepted by public
welfare agencies, with assistance and housing assured,
will be required to set date for departures. If housing
is not assured the district offices will attempt to
secure it.
Dependent. families Who refuse to indicate choice of
location. or to discuss relocation. will have to make
their relocation plans by a certain date or plans will
be made for them. No transportation or other financial
assistance shall be provided to dependent persons who
depart for States in which they have no legal residence,
without assumption of responsibility for their support
by other members of the family and without approval ofpublic welfare agencies in the community of destination. 
This was followed by an a~nistrative notice, dated August 1. 
which provided for scheduling the departure of all remaining center 
residents during the last 6 weeks of the centers' existence. In 
effect, this plan was a practical device for arranging an even flow
of evacuees to th~ outside during the closing period. It was adopted
only after careful consideration and weighing of many factors.
Unquestionably, it would have been desirable if all evacuees
could have left the centers at their awn rate of speed, with WRA acting
merely as adviser and assistant. Many reasons p~evented this, not the
least of ~hich was that 3 years of life in the centers where food,
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-clothing, and other necessities were provided, had gradually sapped
individual initiative. Many evacuees were willing to let things drift
until they were ordered to leave, as they had bee.n ordered to evacuate.
Parts of the scheduling notice which explain its need follows:
In order to perform effectively the admdnistrative task
of closing the relocation centers on the dates established,
it will be necessary for "the project director of each center 
to prescribe, in advance, q"otas for terminal departures
during the last few weeks. The importance of giving
tadividual attention to the assistance needed by conter
residents in completing their relocation plans, and the
need for scheduling the use of transportation facilities,
make it unwise to permit large groups of evacuees to
postpone their departure until the last few days.
* * * Not later than 6 weeks before the date on Which
the center is to be closed. the project director shall
adjust the schedule of'terminal departures to the
population still resident in the center and shall
then assign weekly and daily quotas for the departure
of the remaining residents.
* * * If any resident shall refuse to arrange for
packing of personal effects, arrangements for the
packing to insure his leaving according ~o schedule
shall be made for him. If the resident shall have
refused to select a destination for relocation.
transportation shall be arran~ed to his place of legal
residenoe which will. in nearly every case, be the
place from which he was evacuated. If such persons
wish to adjust their plans and leave at an earlier
date, they shall be given assist~ce in completing
arrangements. The attitude of such persons shall
I not effect their eligibility for relocation assist-
ance grants, temporary assistance, travel grants, and
other assistance provided by WRA.
The National Director wrote to each project director, explaining
the quota method, and offering several suggestions for its application.
some of which are as follows:
IVe should be careful not to schedule people for
departure * * * into districts where temporary
housing is not available.
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. . . we should not lose sight of the reason for
scheduling terminal departures during the last weeks.
This is in no sense a punitive measure. It is intended
merely to enable us to do a good administrative job.
We need a relatively even flow during the last few
weeks so that we ~y continue to give individual
assistance to center residents in completing their
relocation plans and so that we may sehedule the use
of transportation facilities in such manner as to
avoid last minute hardships.
Issuance of these instructions dispelled all'ideas in the centers
that there was a possibility of their not being entirely closed. Prac-
tically all residents now began making definite plans to leave,
. including even those who had pr eviously indicated that they would make
no plans. By September 1, the number of persons leaving the centers
rose to an average of 3,000 persons weekly.
At this time, the Western Defense Command issued Public
Proclamation No. 24, removing restrictions on the return to the evacu-
ated area for individual excludees, and the last barrier to relocation
vanished. During September, most restrictions by the Government were
removed in regard to the hiring of citizens of Japanese ancestry, both
in war plants and in Federal Service. During this month more than
15,000 people relocated.
Nearly every center closed before the scheduled date. Units II
and III at Poston, each at one time housing more than 4,000 evacuees,
closed on September 28 and 29, a day or two ahead of" schedule. In
both camps, a few individuals were transferred temporarily to Poston I
because of transportation or unresolved welfare problems. Granada and
Central Utah closed exactly on schedule; ~l1inidoka, 2 days early. Both
Heart Mountain and Gila River, 5 days early; Colorado River, 2 days
early, and Manzanar, 9 days early. Rohwer closed on November 30, 15
days ahead of schedule.
Center closings were a Herculean task for the appointed staff
and were not effected without confusion and some discomfort on the
part of evacuees. For some of the aged and for a small percentage of
weaker individuals, the closing days were periods of real mental dis-
tress. However, for the greater 8ajority of the people, the end of a
long period of indecision came as a welcome relief, and most of those
departing looked forward with interest and curiosity, and in general,
with considerable assurance to returning home.
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'rULE LAKE
-
Throughout the program, relocation was hampered by the uncertain
status of persons who were detained because some question had been
raised concerning their loyalty. The number of persons actually
detained delayed the relocation of a far greater number because of
family ties and friendly relationships. At the time the WRA liquida-
tion program was worked out, negotiations were held with the Department
of Justice and it was agreed that before the WRA went out of business,
persons detained in Tule Lake and in other centers would be transferred
to the jurisdiction of the Justice Department.
Throughout the year 1945 there remained in the other relocation
centers a number of persons Who were being detained by the Department
of Justice or the War Department. These persons were a source of
continual difficulty to the relocation program as they influenced other
persons eligible for relocation. With the end of the war, the majority
of these persons were freed from detention orders and were eventually
relocated. Throughout 1945 the \~ carried on a relocation program in
Tule Lake for the persons who were not detained. However, in view of
the fact that the majority of the fwmilies in Tule Lake had at least
one family member under some type of detention order, it was extremely
difficult to carry out a satisfactory relocation plan for most families,
From January 1, until December 1, 1945, approximately 6,000 persons
relocated from Tule Lake. On December 10, 1945, the Department of
Justice indicated that it was going t9 review the detention cases
individually. The Authority then reenforced its relocation staff at
Tule Lake and prepared to handle, in the space of a few weeks' time, as
many people as the Department of Justice decided to release. Interviews
were held for all families and the relocation problems of each ascer-
tained. However, until the final day of center closure WRA never knew
from one day to the next which individuals would be eligible for relo-
catio~ and which might be transferred to the Department of Justice.
Neither was it able to tell the evacuees that were free to relocate
whether the Department of Justice would maintain a shelter for depend-
ent family members of detained heads of fwmilies. Little by little,
however, the majority of the persons in Tule Lake were released by the
Department of Justice and were subsequently relocated. The center was
closed on March 20,1946, when the Department of Justice transferred to
internment camps the remaining 447 evacuees Who were being detained.
Because of the reputation which Tule Lake had acquired in the public
mind, many persons were fearful of the public reaction on the west coast
in relocating Tuleans as they were released by the Department of Justioe.
Very little diffioulty was evidenced in. this regard. The relocation
from Tule Lake of over 8,000 persons from December 1 until March 20
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occupied a great deal of the field relocation of~icers' time which had
been planned for the working out of the final adjustment progrwm of the
entire evacuee population.
CO~LETION OF THE RELOCATION PROGRAM
~ith the closing of the relocation centers, the first phase of .
the relocation progrwm was completed. There remained the jobs of
assisting the last thousands who had left the centers to secure initial
settlement, in the communities to which they had gone, and of making
certain that communities were adequately prepared to give such'continu-
ing services as might be needed after the War Relocation Authority
closed its offices.
The Authority continued to give travel assistance to those
evacuees who had left relocation centers for eastern points prior to
the lifting of the exclusion order and who now wished to return to their
former homes on the west coast. Transportation continued to oe availa-
ble both for the individua~s and for their household goods, up to
February 28, 1946. Between the closing of the last relocation center
and the last date on Which such travel assistance could be given, there
was a considerable increase in the number of persons availing themselves
of this service, but the majority of the resettlers did not do so,
choosing to remain in the communities in which they had relocated.
The Director and the Chief of the Relocation Division spent the
first 3 weeks in December 1945 visiting the larger relocation areas on
the west coast to determine what major problems remained. In general
condi tions were found to be satisfactory. Community acceptance had
improved greatly. The majority of the evacuees were happy to be back
home and were making a good adjustment. Employment was readily availa-
ble, altho,ugh within a restricted range of occupations. Housing
remained the most difficult problem out was ~vailable for all returnees
on at least a temporary basis. It was decided to keep most district
offices, on the west coast open until May 1, and the area offices open
until May 15, 1946. These were the latest dates that could be con-
sidered since the Authority's entire progrwm was to be liquidated oy
June 30. District officers were instructed to conduct intensive inter-
viewing programs among the evacuees to determine their remaining
problems. This interviewing program was intended to include every
evacuee insofar as possible and wes to ascertain housing need, employ-
ment problems, medical and social problems, and any instances of racial
discrimination. It was recognized that some hardship cases we.re not
known ~o the Authority, and this interviewing program was intended to
find and assist these families. Area ,offices were given authorization
to recommend special grants for furniture and household equipment as
needs were found to be genuin~ and urgent.
(81)
This program was carried through with considerable success in
the San Francisco and Seattle areas. In the San Francisco area alone
families representing approximately 30,000 people were interviewed and
their problems worked out by relocation officers. In the Los Angeles
area the acute housing p.roblem occupied the full time. of most staff 
members and only known hardship cases were interviewed. In the Seattle
area the majority of families were interviewe~.
In addition to assisting families to find adequate shelter, the
\
Authority's housing job included also the disposal of temporary housing
installations it had obtained in California through joint arrangement
wi th the War Department and the Federal Public Housing Authority. By
the 1st of December the FPRA was operating temporary hous1n~ for the
WRA at Camp Kohler, Sacramento; Hunters Point .and Camp Funston, San
Francisco; the A~ Air Base at Santa Ana; and six former Army instal-
lations in Los Angeles County. Los Angeles installations included
Winona and ~~gnolia sites in Burbank, one site in Santa Monica, one in
El Segundo, one in Hawthorne, and one at Lomita. While the Director and
the Chief of the Relocation Division were on the west coast in early
December, a program for the liquidation of these sites was agreed upon. 
V¥RA personnel in districts where the housing problem was most acute were
given the specific responsibility of locating housing for specified
families. Relocation officers with agricultural backgrounds were
assigned farm families, and specialists in urban and domestic employmen~
to take care of the others. In general the plan was to find employment
for the workers in these families vrhichwould provide or include housing
for the family unit. Between December 1945 and lAarch 1, 1946, the staff
worked hard at carrying out this plan, and with considerable success in
some districts. Fort Funston was completely emptied by the fir-st week
in December, and Camp Kohler by March 15. However, at Hunters Point
and other installations in southern California, some difficulties were
encountered. At Hunters Point the housing provided only coromunity
cooking and bathing facilities, but was superior to that occupied by
many other evacuees in the San Francisco area. Evacuees living there
were natu.rally reluctant to move. Adequate apartments in the FPHA
project at Ricrunond "Nere found for all families living at Hunters
Point, but while these apartments were better. evacuees were still
reluctant to move, since Richmond was across the bay and was less
convenient to their.jobs. At the time the San Francisco office was
closed on May 15, approximately 117 families still remained in these
dormitories. The '/var Relocation Authority transferred sufficient funds
to the FPHA to convert these dormitories into family units.
In southern California efforts to move fwnilies into individual
units met with less success. While a great many job and housing oppor-
tunities were found. especially in domestic and agricultural work, a
large percentage of the evacuees preferred to remain in the housing
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installations despite their inadequacy. Many fami~ies were receiving
full support from the local welfare department and expressed the belief
that they could live better on relief than they could on the wages
offered by domestic and farm jobs vmich provided housing. Some families
were reluctant to give up the group living to which they had become
accustomed after 4 years of institutional life in relocation centers.
Arguments, advanced by the Authority's staff 'that it would be to the
. advantage- both of the individual families and of the entire group for
them to leave these installations. fell on deaf ears. Little success
was had up to March 1 in moving out many of these families. Evacuees
frequently told relocation officers that they would continue in these
installations until the latter were closed at which time they would
attempt to find something else.
The Authority was faced with a difficult situation. It had to
dispose of these installations before going out of existence on June 30.
The families resident in them refused to move. The Authority at this
time asked the War Assets Administration if the barracks it owned could
be turned over to FPHA or to the county of Los Angeles or a private
welfare organization for the continued housing of evacuees. The
Authority was advised that such procedure was impossible. ~nd that the
only means of disposing of these installations was to de9lare them
surplus to the War Assets Administration. The ~ar Assets Administration
would then have to dispose of th6m through regular channels and no
assurance could be given that any particular purchaser. no matter how
willing to continue with the evacuees as tenants, would s~cure them.
The Chief of the Relocation Division went to the west coast to try to
work out a definite program for providing other h~using for people
remaining in the installations. Negotiations were entered into with
the FPHA and the country of Los Angeles. The county of Los Angeles
finally agreed to take care of 250 persons needing domiciliary or other
institutional c~re. out of the 26100 persons then living in the six
temporary installations". FPHA agreed to house the 367 persons in
veteran or service-connected families by moving them into more perma-
nent public housing projects. The FPHA also agreed that if the War
Relocation Authority would provide funds for tearing down the barracks
at Vlinona site in Burbank6 and would assemble at the Winona site 300 of
the FPI~ trailers then scattered among the six installations. the FPHA
would take this trai ler project over and operate it as a standard FPHA
trailer camp. The Authority was also to provide the funds to the FPHA
to bring these trailers up to standard. FPHA further agreed that if
the ;i7RA would find individual placements for 150 trailers. FPHA would
rent these trailers to employers or other persons willing to provide
housing for evacuee families.
Under these arrangements at least 16000 persons could be housed
at the new trailer camp in Burbank. These, plus the 250 the county was
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to assume responsibility for, and 367 persons in veteran or service-
connected families, made a total of 1,617 persons of the total of
2,100 persons residing in the Authority's installations in Los Angeles
County. The remaining 482 persons could be accommodated in the 150
trailers to be placed out on rental, or by moving to alternative housing!
which some of them had. i
. I
FPHA, the County of Los Angeles, and the Authority were pleased
with this arrangemen~ and were sure that it was the best that could be
done considering the extreme stringency in regard to housing existing
in the locality. Each of the types of housing to be furnished would be
far superior to that existing in the temporary installations. However,
the program was no sooner announced than the Authority began to receive
complaints from the evacuees living in the installations and from some
other persons friendly to the evacuees, charging that these additional
moves were' unnecessary and that the evacuees were being pushed around.
Some ill-advised well-wishers advised the evacuees to sit tight in the
temporary installations and refuse to move. It was necessary to
complete the Winona project with a great deal of speed and move the
service-connected persons and tllose needing domiciliary care in a very
short time in order to meet the deadline for closing of WRA operations
on the west coast. During April and continuing-into May, the Los
Angeles WRA. staff devoted almost full time to the problems involved in
assisting the people to move. In spite of the opposition and the dif-
ficulties involved, by May 15 all installations except the Lomita Air
Strip had been olo,sed. There remained at Lomita approximately 130
persons Who were scheduled to move to two private trailer camps. These
camps were habitable but not complete. WRA suggested that the residents
move so that WRA could assist before closing its office. Hoy_ever, the
Bureau of Public Assistance advised the evacuees not to move until all
facilities at the trailer camps were complete. The VffiA, therefore,
closed its offices and left the evacuees in Lomita under the sponsorship
of Los Angeles County.
In planning the closing of field offices throughout the country,
sufficient time was allowed to assist in completing initial readjustment
of the last resettlers to leave the centers and to complete plans for
continued services to resettlers after these offices were closed. It
was decided that area offices would close on May 15, 1946, with the
exception of the New Orleans office which was to close on April 1.
District offices were to close on a staggered schedule based on the
number of resettlers in the district and the tilnB that the office had
had to prepare for.their continued social adjustment. By April 15, all
district of~ices outside of the evacuated area were closed. The major
district offices on the west coast remained in operation until May 1
with the Los Angeles district office remaining open unti11~y 15.
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The first indications earlier in 1945 that the WRA was planning
to end its field services and complet~ all its operations by mid-1946
brought protests from some sources that the Japanese population would
require continuing Federal assistance after that date. The Director
took the position that such continuing s~ces as might be needed for
this one segment of the population. were not a fUnction of the Federal
Government and particularly not of a temporary wartime agency. He
believed that these problems could be handled by established agencies
and volunteer individuals already familiar wi th the evacuee and his
problems and willing and able to continue to assist him.
To assure such continuing assistance in local communities. a
Relocation Division memorandum was issued in September 1945 ins~ructing
relocation officers to make communi ~ organizations for continued aid
to evacuees a major function of their liquidation program. This memo-
randum suggested that in each community Where a substantial number of
evacuees had resettled. the district relocation officer should ar~ge
for a meeting of interested coIllImlnity agencies. organizations. and'
concerned individuals including representation from the resettlers
themsel ves. The purpos e of these meetings was to have the commmi ty
analyze the immediate and long-term needs of the resettlers and to
develop the machinery necessary to meet these needs.
As a result of fina~ community organization work undertaken by
the Authority's field staff. there was at the closing of the Authority's
program an effective local organization carrying on many of its services
to resettlers in almost every community having any sizable number o~
Japanese living in it. In those few instances in which communities
did not actually develop an organization primarily concerned with the
local Japanese population. organizations of broader scope agreed to
include the problems of the Japanese in their long-range progrwms and
concerned individuals had agreed to continue to assist resettlers in
meeting any difficulties Which might arise. In larger cities strong
organizations were functioning with assi'stance to the evacuees as their
primary concern. In some localities these organizations were made up
largely of resettlers. with other local people agreeing to assist in
their specialized fields. In other cities committees were made up
largely of representatives of churches. welfare agencies, and profes-
sional and businessmen, with only a small resettler representation.
It may be presumed that in general such committees will continue
to exist and function as long as there is need for them. but. in many
communities by the spring of 1946, such groups were finding almost no
calls being made upon them for service. and some committe6s believed
that there would be no need for their continuing beyond the end of the
year.
(85)
RESU1I4E OF EVACUEE ACCEPTANCE AND ADJUSTMENT OUTSIDE THE EVACUATED AREA
From the start of ~ne relocation program, the WRA faced widely
different circumstances in various sections of the country in regard to
the acceptance of evacuees. These sectional jifferenoes had a material
effect on the eventual distribution of the evacuee population and on
their adjustment in communities of resettlement.
The dispersion of the evacuees throughout the country was
accepted as a desirable objective early in the program. The Chief of
the Employment Division r~corded that "by the middle of June Ll94Y it
was pretty clear that \'niA could count on a program for seasonal work
outside the camps in western agriculture, but this did not seem to us
to be enough. * * * As we saw the problem. a program which would permit
permanent relocation was equally as important as the maintenance of
camps. The resettlement of the evacuees throughout the country would 
contribute useful manpower to the count~. It would salvage the
Japanese as Americans and would bolster the morale of the relocation
centers. Beyond these iJmnediate advantages of relocation it was hoped
that this awareness of approval might even go a long way toward solving
the problem of the Japanese minority in the United states through an
elimination of the pressure that had been generated by excessive
concentration on the west coast."
It was decided to start relocation in the Inter-IJountain states
and in the Middle West. since the early war hysteria particularly in
regard to the possibility of coastal invasions was less strong there
than along the eastern coast. The -{war Department had asked the
Authority not to issue leave for relocation in the Eastern Defense
Command and Gulf Coast areas without special Viar Department clearance
of each individual case.
The Chief of the Employment Division made a trip through Michigan
and Illinois to appraise employment possibilities there. This trip
convinced him that a considerable number of evacuees. especially the
Nisei, could find new homes in the Middle West.
Time has verified his prediction. By the end of 1945, there were
some 18.000 Japanese resettled in the north central area. which included
the States of Indiana. Illinois, Wisconsin. Minnesota and eastern North
Dakota. I~issouri, Kansas. Iowa. the eastern halves of Nebraska and South
Dakota, and the northern peninsula of Michigan. About 12.000 of these
resettlers were in the city of Chicago. For the most part they are not
self-amployed but are employed by thousands of companies and individuals
representing a normal cross-section of employment. Almost every type or
occupation is represented in the group. In communities which have
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attracted ~y number of resettlers, their presence is no longer a
novelty or occasion for comment. In Chicago, for tnstance, they are
housed in every type of neighborhood and in almost every neighborhood.
The quality of housing ranges from poor to good, with the bulk of it in
fair neighborhoods. In all other cities in the area, housing ranges
from fair to exce~lent, with the bulk of the Japanese living in good
neighborhoods. Social acceptance is limited chiefly ~y the hesitancy
of the group to participate fully in the social life of the 90mmunity
rather than by unWillingness of the cozmmmi ty to welcome such partici-
pation. It is questionable whether the hesitancy of the group is
greater than is normal for first and second generation residents in a
new country.
To a great'extent a fair reception was apparently ready and
wai ting for Japanese in many communi ties in the Chicago area. One of
the relocation officers, who had been in placement work in Chicago,
particularly with minority groups for some years before coming to the
WRA, relates that on coming to work in this agency he anticipated the
most difficult plac8ment work he had ever attempted. In his first
day's contacts with Chicago enployers he called on two companies, one
a large candy manufacturing concern and the other a small plant doing
essential war work, a manufacturer of marine valves for the Navy. The
candy company saw no basis for concern over the national origin of the
Japanese it was proposing to hire, and suggested that 15 or 20 might be
tried as a starter although it saw possibilities for the employment of
hundreds of resettlers. The war plant owner scoffed at the idea that
there would be any objection to the employment of resettl.ers in his
o~ganization, and offered employment to skilled machinists and also
particularly asked for a girl to serve as receptionist for the front
office--by all odds the most conspicuous job in the organization. The
girl who was placed in this job in March 1943 was still employed in
the same position When the field office .closed.
Commercial amusements and social activities, such as are offered
by theaters, public dancing places, taverns, cocktail bars, bowling
alleys, skating rinks, and restaurants, have been freely patronized by
resettlers. The only known instance of specific discrimination against
resettlers in commercial places of amusement was in the two largest
public dance halls in Chicago which, after initially welcoming reset-
tlers, for a time did not admit them. Efforts of the Chicago district
office to regain acceptance were not immediately successful, but both
ef these dance halls later ch~ged their policies and again admitted
Japanese.
The instances in which public acceptance in the Middle West was
not good were phenomenally few in number, and, where these represented
in any sense an action of the community, they ,vere in rural or small
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town districts. Major incidents can almost be counted on the fingers
of one hand, including three farm difficulties occuring at Cozad, Neb.,
Hamburg, Iowa, and Marengo. Ill., and some difficulty with the Illinois
Central Railroad in Chicago. In Nebraska several families left a farm
under pressu~e from the oommunity~ and in Iowa the purchase of a farm
was blocked by community attitudes. At Marengo, there was some small
but vocal objection to evacuee far~rs coming into the oomJmmity, but
this opposition was overridden, and Marengo has proved a satisfactory
resettlement point throughout the program. The Illinois Central
Railroad situation in ~o sense represented an attitude on the part of
Chicago~ and probably did not represent an attitude on the part of very
many Chicago railroad workers. The employment of a considerable number
of resettler railroad workers was blocked by a thr~at of strike from
the national office of the track workers union (AFL) located in Detroit.
The probabilities are that the union uied the employment of these reset-
tlers as a basis for leverage in a union-management argument over wages
and the employment of Mexican nationals.
Public acceptance for resettlers in the Middle West was
undoubtedly greatly increased by the work of the WRA staff and by the
public relations work done by interested groups and individuals in the
communi ty, but basically public acceptance was fundamentally good to
start with in most communi ties.
Although large numbers of evacuees resettled in the north central
area, they located almost entirely in the cities. Outside of northern
Illinois~ Missouri ~nd Nebraska, there are only a few evacuee farm
families in the area. It is estimated that only about 2 percent of the
~esettlers living in the entire north central area are engaged in farm-
ing. This fact is not due to any lack of effort on the part of WRA nor
to any lack of opportunities for rural resettlement in this area. An
agricultural specialist was employed on the area staff, and he and the
district relocation officers developed many attractive farm offers for
evacuees. There were many reasons for the lack of interest on the par~
of evacuees, but the principal one was the dissi~ilarity of-midwestern
farming from the type of agriculture with which the evacuees were
familiar on the west coast.
Like the north central area, the Great Lakes area, including
the States of l~ichigan (excluding upper peninsula), Ohio~ Kentuoky, West
Virginia, the western part of Pennsylvania and the western part of New
York, offered excellent opportunities for resettlement of Japanese
Americans. Employment offers were plentiful and community acceptance
was present from the .beginning.
Instances of discrimination and prejudice were few in number and
not important, and in no case did they represent the attitude of any
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appreciable segment of the comImlnity. In one case, in Pit"tsuburgh in
June 1945, a controversy was touched off by a press announcement that a
vacant orphanage had been donated as temporary quarters for a hostel.
A small group of residents of the neighborhood held a protest meeting,
circulated a petition, and tried to get an injunction to prevent use of
the orphanage as a hostel. The case was dismissed with the ruling that
"co~aon pleas court had no jurisdiction in the matter." During the
. s~er, while court action was p.ending, the hostel was used without
incident. It had also been learned that only 36 residents of the ward
had signed the original petition, although the population of the ward
was 24,982.
For almost a year and a half, the Western Reserve University had
refused to admit Nisei students, and gave as its reason that "Government
agenci es with which the uni vers i ty had contracts for carrying on oonfi-
dential war research indicate that they do not wish us to enroll stu-
dents of Japanese origin for the present." This statement was not true,
since PMGO clearance had been obtained for this school. 1f~en the story
appeared in the newspapers~ t~e president of the university reversed
his ruling and six Nisei were immediately enrolled.
The city of Cleveland, Ohio, which attracted some 2,400 reset-
tIers, was the favorite place for resettlement in the Great Lakes area.
Aside from the extremely favorable employment situation there, the fact
that the vtRA office was opened early in the program (January 1943) and
that ooramunity interest was already awakened were important factors in
the popularity of Cleveland. The groundwork for relocation in Cleveland
was done by a committee composed of many influential and highly re-
spected local citizens to pave the way for the resettlement of evacuees.
-It was organized in November 1942, and remained a positive force in the
program in Cleveland~ complementing and supplementing the work of the
V~ office and exerting a marked degree of leadership in the community.
Awareness of the commi~teets activities quickly spread among the
evacuees and had a good effect on their-morale.
The east coast area, comprising the States of Maine, .New
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, ~Iaryland, North Carolina, Virginia,
and the District of Columbia, was also a po~ular region for relocation,
although the full potentialities of this area were not adequately
exploited. This was primarily because of earlier limitations on grant-
ing leave to the east coast and the resultant relatively late date at
which WRA began to operate field offices in this area. The east coast
area was not able to function on an equal basis with midw8stern areas
until 1945, and by that time many of the families in the centers had
already set their resettlement destinations elsewhere.
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-~
f
The east coast area presented favorable possibilities for reset-
tlement. ~~acuees were readily introduced into various communities,
and public acceptance generally was good. There were a few incidents
of prejudice, nope of which were especially significant except as they
may have been exaggerated in the relocation centers. In one case. known
as the "Great Meadows incident," several Issei farmers were forced to
leave Rehobeth. Del., as the result of protests and threats by neigh-
boring farmers. In New York City. Mayor La Guardia publicly expressed
opposition to an influx of Japanese Americans, stating it might compli-
cate the city's already serious racial and minority problems. Later
some property owners protested the establishment of a hostel in
Brooklyn. These protests brought forth the active support of many
influential individuals and organizations in the city, and in the end
probably helped rather than hindered the relocation program. The
employment of an Issei physicist by Smith College in Northhampton,
Mass., drew national attention in the newspapers and radio for a time,
but the situation resolved itself when the evacuee was inducted into
the Army. In the spring of 1944 a Nisei was obliged to quit his job
as chemist in East Providence, R. I., because of the objections of
fellow workers. Newspapers in Lowell and Lawrence, l~ss., wer~ antago-
nistic on one occasion. Most of these incidents, however, were
sporadic short-lived flare-ups of prejudice based on misinformation
or selfish interests, and did not reflect widespread public attitudes.
New York City, which had a prewar Japanese population of about
2,000, attracted about that same mumber of resettlers. Many new
evacuee-owned businesses were established, and virtually all types
of employment and professional opportunities were open to the reset-
tlers in accordance with their skills.
Seabrook Farms, located near Bridgeton, N. J., was the only
rural place outside of the intermountain States and the west coast to
attract any substantial number of evacuees. By December 1945, 1,769
eyacuees had resettled at Seabrook, 1,024 of whom were employed in the
processing plant and on specialized jobs. Seabrook Farms, which is
made up of 16 companies and corporations, operates a huge truck farming
enterprise and freezing plant. In November 1943, when the ~ntA repre-
sentative first called upon Seabrook Farms regarding employment possi-
bilities for evacuees, immeaiate recruitment of 200 people, preferably
in family groups was requested. If these were able to adjust satisfac-
torily, Seabrook indicated it would wish to employ a substantial number
of additional evacuees. Recruiters went into the centers to describe
workinG conditions and to sign workers. At the same time various dif-
ficul ties arising from requirements of the fiar Manpower Commission and
the Army's Second Service Command. which required individual investi-
gation of recruits because of the Army's contracts with Seabrook, were-
gradually being overcome by persistent 'nRA and Seabrook effort.
Except for Seabrook Barffis, which. is a community in itself,
acceptance for evacuees was better in urban than in rural coInrnlm ties
in the east coast area, and most of the resettlers are in cities.
The southern area, comprising the States of Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Oklahoma,
Arkansas, Tennessee and Texas presented somewhat different relocation
problems. It was hoped that the South, 'Florida and Texas particularly,
would attract evacuee farmers because of the similarity of climate and
types of farming to those in California. Actually, however, only
about ~OO evacuees resettled in the entire southern area.
The South got off to a late start--as did the east coast--part~
because of earlier reluctance of the Army to permit resettlement along
the eastern seaboard and the gulf'coast. Also the establishment of
two relocation centers (Jerome and Rohwer) in Arkansas touched off a
great deal of resentment and prejudice in that state which spread into
the surrounding states.
~ the fall of 1943 the Authority decided.that relocation in
the South was possible. The evacuees had proved at. the Jerome and
Rohwer centers that vegetable culture on a large scale was feasible.
The Authority saw the South as offering an opportunity to successfully
relocate a large,number of its farm families. It also thought that
the relocation of a large number of experienced vegetable growers in
the South would introduce a valuable new industry which would greatly
benefit the area. However, few evacuees accepted the opportunities
offered them. A factor Which made the South unpopular among evacuees
was their concern about th~ Negro situation there, and their fears
that persons of Japanese ancestry might be subject to the same dis-
crimination and Jim-Crowism as was practiced against the Negro. At
Camp Shelby, Miss., where some Nisei soldiers were in training, their
children were at first required to attend Negro schools because of a
State law requiring segregation of Caucasian children from those of
other racial origins. Except for this instance, there is no pdinted
indication that the South would have placed the Japanese in the same
status as the .Negi'o. However, this fear was present in the minds of
the evacuees. The tolerance of the South toward Japanese was not
fully tested since evacuees did not resettle in this area in signif-
icantly large numbers.
Except for the Camp Shelby si t,uation and in Arkansas, there
were very few instances of overt discrimination against evacnees in
the southern states. One incident occurred near New Orleans, when a
group of evacuees from the centers went there to investigate agricul-
tural opportunities. 'rwo parishes (Plaquelnine and st. Bernard) passed
ordinances to prevent evacuees from settling there.
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Unlike other distr~Gts of the southern area, the relocation
program in the Little Rock district met with considerable opposition
in its earliest stages. The Governor of Arkansas was vocal in his
opposition to relocation of evacuees in the State of Arkansas; the
State legislature passed acts directed against persons of Japanese
ancestry; evacuee parents were denied birth certif~cates for their
children born in the relocation centers in Arkansas. A citizen of
Jerome, Ark., shot at, but missed, a Japanese American soldier on
leave from Camp Robinson near Little Rock; a farmer returning from a
"squirrel shoot" shot at three evacuees in a woods near l~cGehee, Ark.,
wounding tyro and missing the third. There were in Arkansas a far
greater number of people, however, who were just as active in cham~
pioning the riL;.l}1ts of the evacuees. The Yiilson Plantation, located in
northeast Arkansas, offered one of the best resettlement opportunities
for evacuees,. This farm contains 6.3,000 acres. It was a cotton farm,
but planned' a change to more diversified row-crop production. It
sought a number of evacuees to pioneer in this work. There are 77
different industries built around this giant farm. Schools are
superior to the average for the State. School buses serve the entire
plantation. Houses are far above the average tenant houses. Various
types of contracts were available to the evacuees--cash rent, share
cropJ and wage work. Wilson Plantation offered opportuniti.es for 1,000
evacuee families, but only 17 evacuee families comprising 87 people
chose to resettle there.
Vi nile few eva~lee5 settled in the South, those that did are
making an excellent adjustment both socially and economically. ,Because
of the financial success of those few farmers that settled there, it is
entirely possible that more Japanese will eventually relocate there.
The intermountain area included eastern ~Vashington, eastern
Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Nevada and Wyoming. The Great Plains
area, included the states of Colorado, southeastern }~ontana, western
North Dakota, \~yoming, western South Dakota, western Nebraska, New
1Jexico and southwestern Texas. These two areas were much alike in
regard to acceptance of resettlers and the evacuees' adjustment to
their new conurn1nities. Despite the contiInlous progress of relocation
in both of these areas, intolerance and prejudice against persons of
Japanese ances~ry were generally present in one form or another. The
meeting of the western governors, discussed earlier in this report,
started off the 11esettlement program in these areas under a serious
handicap. Only one western governor (Carr of Colorado) showed any
graciousness about allowing the evacuated people to come to his state.
This antagonistic attitude never entirely disappeared from the
"official" picture, but few officials oper:lly fought relocation once it
got under way, because of the economic pressures from employers to
bring in more evacuees.
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Adverse feelin:~s sor,1etimes took the form of violence. On one
occasion in 1944. shots vlere fired throuf~h windovfs of evacuee homes
near :3ri"'har!1 ;ity, Utah, and on ano.ther into the labor Car?lp at Provo.
'~.hj.le there Yfere a number of such instances, there y;ere also many
cases of Col1~,~Jni tj.es backinr an individual !~isei or an evacuee familJr.
l"or ex8!!lple,. there vIas the instance of civic leaders of V:alla I'lalla
aidin~ one E:vacuee f'C?nlily in finding a home so that they would have a
place tc 1vrlicll tr~eir Ylounded veteran son could !!eturn from the f..rmy's
i.:c ~V{ C-eneral l~osri tal.
ltclocation to the interlflountain and Great i-'lains areas vra~
I!lainlJr to places ,;rhich hac] fairly lar:;e prevlar Japanese populations.
:~xcept for sone concentration in ci tj.es such as Denver, ~~eblo, Greeley,
Sal t kkc Ci t:{~ O~en, Boise and Spokane, the majori '~y of the reset-
tlers worked on farms. Apparerltly, the presence of prewar Japanese
in these areas and faJniliarity with the prevailj.n~ type of agrj.culture
were the tV1C principal attractions of these areas for relocation.
In the cities in this area, resettlers [lave opened u.p many
srrlall busj.r:ess ventures, [lost of them desip;ned entirely to serve
evacuees and their needs. ~nterin£ business in these cities, however,
"las not viithout its difficulties. Most businesses were limited in
location by col~lcentration of the population v/hich the~T planned to serve,
but a more serious handicap vias the difficulty many of them encoun-
tered in obtainin~ business licenses in some of these cities. In
Denver for example, the city administration was v/illinF; to issue li-
censes to Japanese, either citizen or alien, for operating: businesses
only in the old section of the city. Some did obtain licenses for
other neic;:)1borhood.s, but authprities used every excuse, valid or other-
Yfise, to avoid issuing them.
Because such lar~ numbers of evacuees were relocating in the
intel'mountain and western plains areas, by mid-lo4.3 communities began
to fear the establishment of heavily concentrated areas of Japanese
similar to the "Little To~JOs" that had existed on the west coast
prior to the \var. Opponents of the evacuees, ~~o had originally fought
the resettlement of any Japanese in these areas, bezan to make capital
of there fears in a revived campaign ar:ainst the resettlers. YJorse
still, many of the people who had befriended the Japanese and aided
in. their relccation began to express fears about these concentrations.
Recognizing these fears and the more favorable opportunities that
existed for evacuees in other parts of the country, iiRA in 1943,
closed these areas to re19cation for a time in the hope of diverting
a greater relocation movement to the East and Vdddle Viest. The
"closing" of these areas consisted of not approving leave for persons
planning to relocate there. An exception to this vI'as those persons
who had family members relocated in these areas. In such cases family
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members, especially parents, were urged to come out and reestablish
the family group, thus stabilizing a bad situation which existed be-
cause of the relocation of large numbers of irresponsible youth. The
plan .1as onlJT partially effective, since some evacuees relocat,ed origi-
nally to other districts only to enter these areas later. Subsequently,
WRA returned to the policy of upholding the rirpt of evacuees to live
where they chose.
THE \~EST COAST
Hostility toward persons of Japanese ancestry had, historically,
been greatest on the Viest coast, particularly in California. In other
sections of the country the "incidents" for the most part were .iso-
lated verbal protests, petitions, an occasional refusal to employ
Japanese Americans or to admit them to universities as students, and
similar brief, unspectacular occurrences. On the west coast, hov.ever,
shots y,ere fired, economic boycotts organized, homes burned, churches
storing evacuee property vandalized, and in one case a cemetery Vias
desecrated.
Race prejudice, instigated by greed, emerges from any serious
study of west coast social, economic and pqlitical history as the
dominant factor behind hostile attitudes toward the Japanese. Antag-
onism was fostered by certain groups almost froffi the beginning of the
Japanese migration to this country in the late nineteenth century.
Real estate restrictions in the large ,vest coast cities forced the
Japanese into segregated districts. Occupational discrimination kept
many members of the younger generation from finding "ork in the "pro-
fessional fields for "Which they had trained; qualified'doctors,
lawyers, clerf.:,YInen, scientists and teachers were generally limited
to service within the Little Tokyos--~~th the alternative of abandoning
their professions. Young Nisei trained in American schools and tau~ht
the theories of de~.ocracy, frequently found the ranks of teachers,
scientis"Gs and engineers closed to applicants with Jt.!tJanese names and
faces~ The California Alien Land Law of 1913 prohibited aliens in-
eli~ble to citizenship from purchasing a3ricultural land and from
leasing it for 8. period longer than three years. The revised land
law of 1920 prevented such aliens from leasing agricultural land or
vlorking on it except on a Yfage basis. Viest coast prejudice was largely
responsible lor the passage of the "exciusion act of 19~4." Prejudice
against persons of Japanese ancestry was nurtured and abette,d by
several pov{erful organizations such as the Native Sons of the Golden
"V.est and by newspapers such as those owned by Hearst and luicClatchy.
r~hen the exclusion orders were finally lifted in December 1944, these
groups; having failed in their effort to force the Government to keep
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the evacuees from returning, intensified their efforts to intimidate
the evacuees themselves, hoping by so doing to make them afraid to
return.
In the face of discrimination and animosity that existed or was
developed on the v,est coast, and the incidents of violence that met
some of the first evacuees vlho returned, it is interesting to note that
50,140 .or 62 percent of the evacuees, still in the centers in January
1945, and 5, 541 ~)eople vlho had already re~ocated elsevlhere, returned
to the '7est coast up to March 30, 1946.
There were a variety of individual reasons wllich led evacuees
to return to the west coast. Some of them owned property, hc:mes and
businesses to \\hich they could return. Others, the aged and the sick,
had to return to their place.of legal residence in order to be eligible
for public assistance. Some were afraid to go to new and strange 
communities. Some had many good friends among the Caucasians, and 
the neighborliness and good will they had experienced in California
before the war far outvleighed th~ instances of discrimination. Others
were just homesick for California.
Added to these reasons, moreover, was awareness of the fact
that something new had been a.dded to the western scene. T,nereas
before the war only the racist anti-Japanese groups had been "iell
organized and vocal, now new organizations had gro'vn up which were
dedicated to the 'principles of fair play for minority groups. These
groups--such as the Pacific Coas:t Committee on American Principles
and Fair Play, and the Councils for Civic Unity--were composed of
fair-minded, energetic and influential people, and they demanded
protection and opportunity for the returning evacuees.
At the time tr..e field offices were closed on I.lay 15 conditions
,vere found to be 0 generally satisfactory in 1!lashington state. As a
result of the excellent cooperation of the .I'!Etional Housing Agency in
the r~orthv~est, ho~sing had not been the serious problem that it we.s
in California. A su"bstantial number of evacuee businessmen had
successfully reestablished their businesses. In Seattle, a lar'ge
number of hotels and small stores were being operated b:vevacuees.
Greenhouse operators had successfully reinstated ther~selves and
expected no further problems in marketing their goods or in obtaining
supplies. Evacuees were getting back into many labor unions and were
obtaining services even from those who had previously opposed their
return. The principal re~aining difficulty was in finding white-
collar clerical positions for Issei Yiho had )vorked in Japanese es-tablishments prior to evacuation. 'I11e vvelfare depart~ent of " the
Stai;e of Washington ha.d cooperated wholeheartedly, and it appeared that
all needy fawilies Vfere being ade(~uately cared foor.
7000770-46---7
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In Portland, Ore., the situation was similar to that in Viashing-
ton. The only re~l obstacle that had not been overcome was the city
council's refusal to issue liscenses to Issei to operate businesses.
fhany influential people in Portland were workin'g on this problem,
however, arid it seemed likely that the legality "f the city council's
action might soon ge challenged in court.
At Hood River, where a great deal of hostility had been exhibite~
al~ but one of the evacuee growers who had returned had been taken back
into the ap:Jle grOYferS' association, and they were being given excellent
service in the fall harvesting season. In fact, some evacuees had less
trouble gettin;:: their crops harvested than the other growers, because
many friendly groups turned out to assist them. Some stores in Hood
River, hoy;ever, Y(ere continuing to refuse to sell to the evacuees.
Because of this boycott, the evacuees vrere going to The Dalles to do
their shop'ping, and Hood River merchants were beginning to worry about
all the money leaving their community. There were indications that
responsible merchants vlould soon take steps to stamp out all boycotts
against the evacuees.
In northern California, housing continued to be the biggest
problem, bl~tthis was a general situation affecting others besides
the evacuees. The immediate needs of the evacuees had been met.
A number of evacuee businessmen had returned to their
businesses in San Francisco. They Vlere getting along y,-ell. r~ost
of them ,'.ere doing as much if not more business than they had done
before evacuation. Some of the larger merchants who had had big
stores in Chinatown had not returned. Many of these had reestablished
themselves in Chicago and New York. Those who reestablished businesses
in San Francisco T-.'ere, for the most part, serving a mixed clientele
rather than a strictly Japanese one as most of them did before the
war.
Vihile job placement had become more difficult in the East Day
area after ~ne war, there still seemed to be ample opportunities for
evacuees. Ho,-rever, wtlite-collar Issei again presented a problem in
placement. In the Central Valley and other rural areas in northern
Californfa, the demand for evacuee agricultural workers far exceeded
the number of evacuees who wished such employment. !Iilany groups, ,vhich
resisted the evacuees' return v,ere now clamoring for their services.
V;'hile land v.as scarce, marlY of the Nisei vlere obtaining parcels of
ground and were reestablishing themselves as farm op~rators in this
area. The Issei 'vere, of course, unable to reestablish themselves
as operators because of the aLien land law.
Th6 Southern Pacific Railroad was carrying on an intensive
~paign to hire railroad workers. and they y,ere offering jobs, plus
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housing acco~odations, for approximately 8,000 evacuee families.
Several. hundred evacuees were recruited for this work.
All countie~ in California had accepted respon.c;tbility for
evacuee welfare cases.
In ,southern California, housing too was the most serious
. remaining problem but here also the immediate needs had been met.
Jobs were plentiful, except for white-collar openings. The most
attractive offers ?iere for domestic service. Mapy wealthy people
were offering high wages for evacuee families and Yiere providing
 excellent living quarte~s. A number of Hollywood celebrities had
taken evacuee families into their homes and the demand for such
families far exceeded the supply.
The "Little Tokyo" section of Los Angeles had largely been
reoccuplled by the Japanese but on a ttnlch smaller scale.' Many of the
Los Angeles businessmen who had not relocated elsewhere were again
in business. Greenhouse operators thro~ghout the area werereestab-
lishing themselves successfully. The boycott which had been organized
against the evacuees had apparently broken down since the evacuee's
were having no special difficulty in obtaining supplies or in m~keting
their produce. In San Diego, Santa Barbara and other sections of
southern California to which evaCuees had returned, they were making
a satisfactory adjustment.
~VIEWING THE RELOCATION PROGRAM
At the ti~e the Authority ended its field activities, approx-
imately half of the Japanese relocated in this country had returned
t? the west coast; the other half were widely distributed throughout
the rest of the country.
'\\'hile the evacuation caused some evacuees- great financial loss
and me~tal suffering, i~ was not without compensation for some evacuees.
In the process of resettlement, certain advantages accrued to the group
especially to the Nisei in other sections of the country and even on
the west coast. They found a wider va~iety of occupations open to
them than had been available prior to evacuation. Most of them escaped
from segregation in housing and Viere otherwise able to mer~ into the
general social life of ne,w communities to a ~eater degree than they
had previously been able to dOt. In general the anti-Japanese grqups
on the v.'est coast were discredited and had lost the supI-)ort of tne
public.
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While half of the whole group returned to their former homes
considerably less than half of the Nisei (42 percent) returned west-,
ward; conversely, more than half (65 percent) of the Issei chose to
go back West. Some of the relocated evacuees who returned to the west
coast are known to have gone back East again after looking over condi-
tions in their forme~ homes. ~iost of those who returned East were Nisei.
In its relocation pro{!Yam the Authority sought and received the'
support of a great number of agencies--Federal, state and local, public
and private. i'\'hile a few such agencies opposed the program through
ignorance or 'e;i.gotry, the overwhelming majority "l'iere intelligently
understanding and helpful., Similarly. the American people as a whole
proved overwhelmingly willing to 'accept Japanese on a fair basis as
.soon as they could be informed regarding them. The heroic services
of the Japanese American soldiers proved an incontestable 'and over-
wllelming faotor in the education of the public. The good citizenship
and courage of the resettlers themsel~s were major factors in
securing acceptance for them by the general public. The Authority
acknoy;ledges a debt to the newspapers and radio commentators (only
a few chose not to treat evacuees fairly) and to the national magazines'
(many of which carried strong supporting articles and none of which
opposed resettlers).
~bile most organizations and individuals favoring fair treatment
for the evacuees generally accepted and Vient alon~ Yiith the Authority's
relocation program, some Yiell-wishers became emotionally involved 1n
their concern for the ~vacuees and strongly advocated changes in the
Authority's program to which the Authority, neither at the time nor in
retrospect could agree. For instance, there wccs considerable opposition
expressed by friendly -,?:roups to the Authority's decision to close relo-
cation centers. Aside from the practic~l impossibility of indefinitely
continuing to support large numbers of people at public expense without
valid reason, the Authori ty ~.as and is convinced that while some hard-
ships 1'/ere attendant v.pon center closing, the ill effects of continuing
center life on the residents would have caused much greater hardshi'p
had any'number of residents been permitted to continue in them. Some
criticism of the Authority's policies and ;)rogram were, no doubt,
justified but many of the policies which seemed to delay the £ree
return of evacuees to other cormnunities Yiere necessitated b"l! factors
which Viere apparent to the Authority but may not' have been fully
recognized by its critics. Public attitudes and delaying pressures
from the Army had to be carefully Yieighed by the Authority before it
could proceed too vigorously. One of the' criticisms leveled against
the Authority in its carrying out of center closing and the consequE'nt
rapid movement of considerable numbers of people to the west coast was
that the housing sit~ation there was so stringent as to make reloca-
tion there an unreasonable hardship. The Authority did take the
housing situation on the "fest coast into account in planning oenter
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closure, but it Vies tl1e Authclrity's opinion based on careful studies
that the housipg situation, even Yihere it vias most difficult as in
Los Angeles, vvas not impossible. This belief proved to be correct.
Tlle Authority would have liked to see all returnees provided with
modern housing 8.nd fully reestablished economically. However, this
WES no more practical for this group tha~ it wcsfor.millions of
returninf~ veterans. Some impractical "jell-wishers failed to realize
tha.t while a number of individuals ..ere occupying housing less
adequate than that which they had had before the war, great numbers
of persons who had formerly lived in the slums of Little TokyOS or
in what were renerally known in California as "labor shacks" on
tenant farms ;'.ere occupying better housing than they had left at the
time of .evacuation.
1'nile some of the evacuees will never recover from the bitter
experiences. of the evacuation, the Authority is convinced that because
of the industry and integrity of the Japanese Americans, they will
quickly build for themselves a better social and economic pattern
than they had before the war.
(99)
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FIG. 1
NET INCREASE IN FINAL DEPARTURES
1942-1946
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